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The existence of a ‘bidding market’ is commonly cited as a reason to tolerate the creation or 
maintenance of highly concentrated markets. We discuss three erroneous arguments to that 
effect: the ‘consultants’ fallacy’ that ‘market power is impossible’, the ‘academics’ fallacy’ that 
(often) ‘market power does not matter’, and the ‘regulators’ fallacy’ that ‘intervention against 
pernicious market power is unnecessary’, in markets characterized by auctions or bidding 
processes.  
Furthermore we argue that the term ‘bidding market’ as it is widely used in antitrust is 
unhelpful or misleading. Auctions and bidding processes do have some special features—
including their price formation processes, common-values behaviour, and bid-taker power—
but the significance of these features has been overemphasized, and they often imply a 
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 31. Introduction 
The rise of e-commerce, government privatizations, and both public and private 
outsourcing has greatly increased the role of auctions in the economy.
1 At the same 
time auctions are often regarded as ‘different’ from ordinary markets, and antitrust 
policy is often conspicuous by its absence.  
Similarly, many market transactions, especially business-to-business, are conducted 
through informal bidding processes, but it is often claimed that these ‘bidding 
markets’ have such desirable features that ordinary competition policy concerns do 
not apply. Moreover, it has become commonplace for companies to contend that they 
compete primarily in ‘bidding markets’ and that there is therefore little need for further 
antitrust scrutiny.
2 Perhaps because of the frequency with which such arguments 
have been made, they seem also to have seeped into some antitrust agency 
thinking, and ‘the existence of a bidding market is a commonly cited reason by 
competition authorities to tolerate the creation or maintenance of highly concentrated 
markets’ (UK Office of Fair Trading 2004a, paragraph 5.33).
3  
Three distinct strands of thought seem to lie behind the widespread view that 
antitrust can safely ignore markets conducted through bidding processes: 
First are the claims, heavily pushed by legal and economic consulting firms, that in 
‘bidding markets’, market share does not imply market power; that the existence of 
two firms is enough to imply perfect competition, or even that just one firm is enough.  
Second, some academic literature argues that collusion, cartels and mergers can 
actually be desirable in an important class of auctions.   
Finally, some regulators have themselves contended that even if market power can 
in principle be both present and pernicious in auctions and bidding processes, there 
is nevertheless often no need for regulatory intervention. 
This paper explores and—I hope—explodes these myths. More generally, this paper 
analyses the (limited) extent to which the special features of auctions and bidding 
processes mean that competition policy should indeed be different than in ‘ordinary’ 
economic markets.  
We begin with the ‘consultants’ fallacy’ that (roughly) ‘market power is impossible’ in 
a bidding market.
4 We discuss the characteristics that are often claimed for bidding 
markets, and notes that the extreme assumptions of an idealized bidding market can 
indeed yield the extreme conclusions that are often claimed for them. However, 
neither many auctions, nor many more informal bidding processes, satisfy all these 
extreme assumptions, and once we relax any of them we are quickly back into the 
familiar world of problems of dominance and unilateral and coordinated effects. 
Furthermore, the characteristics of (imperfect) bidding markets that cause these 
problems are the standard ones that are commonplace in the checklists that 




1See  Auctions: Theory and Practice, Klemperer (2004). Chapter 1 is an introduction to the theory of auctions. See also 
Klemperer (2000).  
2This has been argued in at least five cases before the UK Competition Commission in the last year.  
3The UK Office of Fair Trading has identified bidding markets in about one-quarter of the merger cases it has handled since it 
started publishing decisions in 2000. 
4It is expressed almost this extremely in some consultants’ submissions to the competition authorities. 
 4The ‘academics’ fallacy’ that (often) ‘market power does not matter’ in an auction
5 
starts from the fact that auctions and bidding processes are often used precisely 
because different market participants have different, and poor, information. In these 
settings each bidder has to worry about the ‘winner’s curse’ that it is more likely to 
win the auction when its rivals have discouraging information about the value of the 
prize. So bidders are more cautious than if they were more confident about their own 
information. In this context a cartel or merger that allows bidders access to more 
information reduces their winner’s curses and so, it is argued, makes them bid more 
aggressively. Unfortunately this analysis is incomplete: we show this so-called 
‘common-value’ effect does not much affect the overall costs of collusion to the bid-
taker. More generally, we emphasize that in either the ‘common values’ or the (more 
standard) ‘private values’ case, the clear formal rules of auctions can facilitate 
predation and collusion.  
Furthermore, markets that operate though ‘ascending’ auctions can be both more 
conducive to coordinated effects and collusion, and less attractive to potential 
entrants (especially in the ‘common values’ case), than either markets with ‘sealed-
bid’ processes or ‘ordinary’ markets. These issues have become more significant 
since the ease of running ascending auctions over the internet has made them far 
more common than previously, when it was harder to conduct them unless bidders 
were physically in the same location. 
Finally, the ‘regulators’ fallacy’ that (put in extreme form) ‘intervention against 
pernicious market power is unnecessary’ contains some truth: it is based on the view 
that bid-takers’ power to set the rules and procedures of the auction can resolve any 
competitive problems.
6 However, if the bid-taker cannot commit to its future 
behaviour, or is susceptible to lobbying, that can undermine its power. Moreover, the 
bid-taker is often severely restricted by legal and political constraints, or its own 
organizational structure (this is particularly likely if the bid-taker is a government 
agency). It is true that with enough care and determination it is usually possible to 
design an auction that can overcome all these problems,
7 but it is often unrealistic to 
expect this to be achieved in practice. Competition policy must sometimes take the 
decision-making structure of other organizations as given—just as it must sometimes 
accept the current industrial structure. In short, we should not be overly sanguine 
about what bid-taker power can achieve. 
Section 2 gives a typical definition of an ideal ‘bidding market’, but shows that 
auctions and bidding processes are often far from this ideal, and section 3 argues 
that the resulting competition problems are therefore essentially the same as those of 
‘ordinary’ markets. The remainder of the paper discusses the limited differences. 
Section 4 outlines the special price-formation process in auctions and bidding 
processes, and shows how their clearly defined rules often facilitate anti-competitive 
behaviour, especially in ascending auctions. Section 5 demonstrates that cartels and 
mergers are probably no less damaging to bid-takers in ‘common-value’ auctions 
than ordinarily, while the predatory and entry deterring possibilities are greater, so 
the existence of common values is probably an argument for tougher rather than 
more lenient competition policy. Section 6 shows how bid-takers’ monopsonistic 
power to set the rules of bidding contests can in principle mitigate the competition 
 
 
5Of course, none of my academic colleagues would dream of expressing this statement without hedging it around with many 
qualifications; the danger is that the qualifications get lost as the ideas enter the policy arena. 
6This is the fallacy that is least easy to pin on any one group. But I have heard it more often in debates about public policy 
(albeit from policy-makers pushing for less regulation) than either from advocates in specific cases, or in more academic fora. 
Perhaps it should be called the ‘deregulator’s fallacy’. Certainly, as will become clear, I exempt my colleagues at the UK 
Competition Commission from this error.  
7The UK 3G auction (that Ken Binmore and I designed) overcame challenges of most of these kinds, but that auction design 
process lasted over two years and was for an auction worth billions of pounds (see Binmore and Klemperer (2002)). 
 5problems, but why this power is often much less effective in practice. Section 7 briefly 
discusses a number of special topics, and section 8 concludes. 
2.  Auctions vs ‘bidding markets’ 
We begin by discussing the features that are often associated with ‘bidding markets’, 
and the extent to which they are found in auctions and bidding processes. 
2.1 (Ideal)  ‘bidding  markets’ 
While the term ‘bidding market’ is frequently used informally, there seems to be no 
agreed definition of one.
8 However, Patterson and Shapiro (2001) write ‘the 
[European] Commission described a true bidding market as one where ‘tenders take 
place infrequently, while the value of each individual contract is usually very 
significant. Contracts are typically awarded to a single successful bidder (so-called 
“winner-takes-all” principle),’ and although it can be debated whether the European 
Commission actually intended this to be a general definition of a ‘bidding market’, this 
is certainly a common interpretation.
9 That is, the term is associated with contests 
where: 
(1) Competition is ‘winner take all’, so each supplier either wins all or none of the 
order. There is therefore no smooth trade-off between the price offered and the 
quantity sold.
10 (This is the last part of the European Commission’s definition 
quoted above.) 
(2) Competition is ‘lumpy’. That is, each contest is large relative to a supplier’s total 
sales in a period, so that there is an element of ‘bet your company’ in any 
contest. (Or, in the European Commission’s definition quoted above, ‘the value of 
each individual contract is usually very significant’.) 
(3) ‘Competition begins afresh for each contract, and for each customer’. That is, if 
there is any repetition of a contest, there is no ‘lock-in’ by which the outcome of 
one contest importantly determines another. (This corresponds roughly to the 
part of the European Commission’s definition quoted above ‘tenders take place 
infrequently’, together with its statement elsewhere that ‘in bidding markets, 




Sometimes a fourth characteristic is assumed either implicitly or explicitly:  




8I will use the term ‘market’ in an informal economic sense. I am not intending to delimit formal antitrust markets. See footnote 
23. 
9Patterson and Shapiro have quoted the European Commission’s statement from Pirelli/BICC merger (European Commission, 
2000). Shapiro had left his position as chief economist at the US Department of Justice at the time of writing. 
10Or quantity bought, if the contestants are potential buyers. Whether the bidders are suppliers competing to sell, or purchasers 
competing to buy, makes no difference to the economic analysis. 
11Draft notice on horizontal mergers (European Commission, 2002 para 14). 
12It fits even more closely with parties’ arguments I have seen (but not accepted) at the UK Competition Commission that, for 
example, ‘in a pure bidding market, the obstacles to switching from one supplier to another are low, and every tender is a new 
contest to be won solely on the merits of the bid’. In publicly-available testimony in another case (in which I was not involved) 
before the Competition Commission, Arcelor said ‘the supply of steel sheet piling in the UK has … the characteristics of a 
‘bidding market’ [that] there are no switching costs between piling from different manufacturers; and most orders are tendered 
for, project-by-project so that, in consequence, market shares in this case do not offer any significant indication of market 
power.’ See UK Competition Commission (2005, para 6.48). Similarly, Owen (2004) writes “A bidding market is one in which 
the competitive significance of each firm, … , is not correlated with its past success and not limited by its current capacity”. 
13Typical parties’ arguments I have seen (and rejected) at the UK Competition Commission include that ‘because a market is a 
bidding market it is easy for non-incumbents to win contracts—most or all sales could easily be lost to a competitor in the next 
round—so existing market shares are of little relevance’. For example, in publicly-available testimony of a case (in which I had 
no involvement) before the Competition Commission, Dräger submitted that ‘The existence of a bidding market makes the 
 6Finally, users of the term ‘bidding market’ typically implicitly or explicitly assume: 
(5) A ‘bidding system’ or ‘bidding process’ is involved.
14  
Note that assumption (5) is a description of the price-formation process whereas 
assumptions (1) to (4*) reflect deeper structural features of the market.
15
The kind of example often offered as a prototypical bidding market is a large, 
indivisible, defence contract for a major weapons system (though this would probably 
not satisfy the additional assumption (4*)). At the opposite extreme, competition 
between supermarkets for consumers exhibits none of these features. Of course, 
many markets lie between the extremes. 
Clearly these assumptions neatly lead to the conclusion that there are few antitrust 
problems in bidding markets: 
With two identical firms, characteristics (1) to (3) perfectly fit a once-and-for-all, 
Bertrand (price-setting), competition for a single consumer who accepts the lowest 
offered price. Such a competition is, of course, also equivalent to the standard 
Bertrand competition in a homogenous-product market with many consumers that is 
described in elementary text-books.  
It is straightforward that the existence of two identical firms is indeed sufficient for 
perfect competition (assuming constant marginal costs and no capacity constraints), 
and that historic market shares imply neither future success nor market power.
16
If we add the ‘easy entry’ assumption, (4*), we have described a perfectly 
contestable market (as described by Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982)), and in this 
case it follows that an optimal outcome is obtained even when only one firm is 
actually present. 
Thus, using (1) to (3), or (1) to (4*) to define a bidding market, it makes sense that 
‘the existence of a bidding market is a commonly cited reason by competition 
authorities to tolerate the creation or maintenance of highly concentrated markets’ 
(UK Office of Fair Trading (2004a, para 5.33)). 
2.2  Auctions and ‘bidding markets’  
The question, of course, is the extent to which the real markets that are described as 
‘bidding markets’ in practice actually correspond to the idealized markets described 
by (1) to (3) or (1) to (4*). In fact, as we now discuss, many markets associated with 
                                                                                                                                                     
relevance of historic market shares questionable … The sales process allows competitors to showcase their products on an 
equal footing with established players. …Purchases are made by tender process and as such all potential competitors have the 
chance to offer a contract to supply …’. See UK Competition Commission (2004b).  
14For example, Lexecon (2003) writes ‘… In many industries, firms purchase services or products through a bidding system … 
The ‘all or nothing’ characteristic of such markets implies … in particular when the size of the tender is high relative to the size 
of the bidder and when new tenders are infrequent …’, thus combining (5) with statements with the flavour of (1), (2), and (3), 
respectively. 
15The other assumptions can also depend on the details of price formation. For example, (4*) (like the theory of contestability) 
may partly depend on incumbents’ prices responding only slowly to new entry. 
16To take just one example of the use of this logic, in one recently completed case at the UK Competition Commission, one of 
the merging parties submitted that ‘the CLSM/MPR and MPLSM sectors should be characterised as bidding markets. As a 
result, a competition assessment based on the analysis of market shares is not useful for assessing the level of competition in 
these markets, as market shares are not indicative of market power ... any increase of share resulting from the merger is 
irrelevant due to the existence of the bidding market.’ See UK Competition Commission (2004a). 
The UK Office of Fair Trading (2004b) is correct to write in its current guideline on the assessment of market power ‘if 
competition at the bidding stage is effective, … currently higher market share would not necessarily reflect market power.’ The 
European Commission (2002) was treading more dangerous ground when it wrote that ‘in bidding markets, market shares may 
not be informative of the likely competitive impact of a merger’—the problem of course comes when the UK Office of Fair 
Trading’s qualifying statement, or the EC’s ‘may’, is omitted.  
 7bidding systems or auctions (ie markets satisfying (5)) violate at least one of (1) to 
(3), while (4*) may very often not be satisfied and, in particular, may apply only rarely 
when (1) and (2) also apply. 
First, many formal auction processes are multi-unit auctions with several winners, so 
violate the ‘winner take all’ condition (1). In particular, in a uniform-price auction, or in 
a simultaneous-ascending auction for multiple homogenous units, all bidders receive 
(essentially) the same price and any bidder who lowers his quantity offer can improve 
his terms of trade (and the terms of trade for all winners). These auctions are 
common for, eg electricity, financial securities and radiospectrum though some of 
them—for example a one-off sale of radiospectrum by the government—may well 
satisfy conditions (2) and (3). 
Furthermore even many single-unit sealed-bid auctions effectively violate condition 
(1): if a bidder cannot predict the required level of a winning bid (perhaps because 
the bidder doesn’t know its opponents’ costs, or perhaps because bidders’ products 
or services are differentiated so that it is not clear how the bid-taker will respond to 
any given price difference) then the bidder faces a trade-off between the price and 
the  expected quantity sold. If bidders are risk-neutral, the effects on price-setting 
behaviour and the incentives to exploit market power are identical to the case in 
which there is a smooth trade-off between price and actual quantity. And even if 
bidders are risk-averse there is no fundamental difference.
17
Transactions in many industries are characterized by more or less formal bidding 
processes that may perhaps satisfy (1) and (3) but not the ‘lumpy competition’ 
assumption, (2). For example, the supply of consulting, architectural, building, or 
other professional services, or contracts to supply retailers, or the supply of steel 
pilings (as in the UK Competition Commission’s recent investigation of Arcelor/Corus) 
might all be characterized by many small essentially independent contracts and so 
fail (at least) criterion (2). 
On the other hand, a contract to supply information technology to a large public 
health authority such as the UK National Health Service, or competition for a rail or 
bus franchise, or to run the UK National Lottery, might satisfy (1) and (2), but not (3), 
because whichever company wins the current contract will have a significant 
advantage in winning a subsequent competition when the current technology needs 
updating or the current franchise expires. The winning bidder may also have an 
advantage in similar contests in other jurisdictions. 
Indeed, the ‘every competition begins afresh’ condition (3) is quite likely not to apply 
if there is repetition of an auction or bidding process, especially if (1) and (2) do 
apply. The reasons for holding an auction include that there is poor information about 
the right price, in which case the winner of the first contract learns valuable 
information about how to bid in future, which makes entering to compete with him 
very dangerous—see our discussion on ‘common values’ in section 5 below. If (1) 
applies, so there is only one winner, that single winner may gain a learning-by-doing 
advantage. And if (1) and (2) both apply, this may be because of economics of scale 
deriving from sunk costs, again, contradicting (3). 
Many auctions fail the ‘easy entry’ assumption, (4*). Of course, many auctions that 
fail (3), eg because of lock-in, fail (4*) for the same reasons. More important, 
satisfying (1) to (3) is likely to be associated with new entry being hard, ie assumption 
(4*) failing, for several reasons: first, the investment and organization required to 
 
 
17That is, there is still a smooth tradeoff between price and the bidtaker’s expected utility. 
 8credibly demonstrate to a bid-taker the ability to enter the market on the large ‘lumpy 
competition’ scale implied by (2), is likely to require at least some sunk costs. If it is 
efficient to have a single winner, as suggested by (1), the economies of scale this 
implies may derive from sunk costs that again make entry hard. The very fact that 
there will be only a single winner blocks small-scale entry that an incumbent might 
otherwise accommodate, and guarantees any potential entrant a fierce reception. 
More generally, if (1) to (3) apply so competition would be very fierce with two or 
more firms, then entry is not very attractive to a second firm even if a single 
incumbent is currently earning substantial rents. So relatively small barriers to entry 
may successfully deter entry, and assumption (4*) fails more easily than if (1) to (3) 
did not hold. 
Some auctions may satisfy none of our criteria. For example, the repeated auctions 
that characterize many modern electricity wholesale markets clearly violate (1), (2) 
and (4*), and also—because of the effects of the frequent repetition on bidders’ 
strategic behaviour—often violate (3). The same may apply to some financial-
securities auctions. 
Indeed whether or not the detailed process of price formation is an auction—ie (5) 
holds—may be a completely academic point. For example, airline tickets are sold 
both through traditional non-auction retail routes, and through priceline.com’s auction 
procedure in which each consumer first enters details of a proposed itinerary and 
airlines then bid electronically to offer the best schedule and fare.
18 But, although 
airlines nominally bid for each customer individually in priceline’s auction, they must 
in practice have pre-specified rules that automatically determine their responses to 
particular requested itineraries, just as in their traditional retailing.
19 Furthermore this 
market (whether run using a formal bidding process or not) seems little different from 
our example of supermarket pricing which exemplified the opposite of a bidding 
market and satisfies none of (1) to (4*): setting a slightly higher fare for a particular 
offering slightly reduces an airline’s sales in just the same way as it would slightly 
reduce a supermarket’s sales;
20 no single transaction is significant; previous sales 
affect the likelihood of future sales (if only because of the existence of frequent-flyer 
programmes, etc.); and, contrary to views expressed in the 1980s, it is now generally 
accepted that there are substantial sunk costs of entering the air travel market. 
In short, just like ‘ordinary’ economic markets, auction markets cover a wide 
spectrum from being close to the ideal ‘bidding market’ described above, to being 
very far away from it. 
So using the term ‘bidding market’ as it is now widely used, to mean either ‘Bertrand 
market’ (restricting to assumptions (1) to (3)), or ‘contestable market’ (if the ‘easy 
entry’ assumption (4*) is added), seems, at best, unnecessary, since the terms 
‘Bertrand market’ and ‘contestable market’ are perfectly adequate. More often—and 
one fears this is why the ‘bidding market’ term is so often used by antitrust 
advocates—the confusion between assumptions (1) to (4*) about the market 
structure, and assumption (5) about details of the price formation process, is 
positively misleading. As we now discuss (in section 3), and as should come as no 
surprise, auctions and bidding processes are beset by the same range of competitive 
problems as ‘ordinary’ economic markets.  
 
 
18There are other services in which airlines simply compete to offer the lowest fare, and Priceline is also famous for a ‘name 
your price’ service.  
19Considering the retail and auction segments as different, or as different markets, might make sense if the different sales 
routes accessed different customers, but not because of any difference in the price-formation process. 
20As noted above, even if there is only one or a small number of passengers on a particular route, a slight increase in fare 
slightly reduces the probability of making a sale. 
 9Nevertheless, so called ‘bidding market’ issues often arise particularly starkly in 
auctions. While an auction process is neither necessary nor sufficient for a ‘bidding 
market’, markets with one or more of the ideal characteristics we described are very 
often organized using a more or less formal bidding process or auction. (The reason 
is that a large transaction size (cf (2)), poor information about the ‘right’ price—more 
likely for a ‘one-off’ contest (cf (3)), or for an idiosyncratic transaction that is likely to 
be efficiently handled by just one winner (cf (1)), or poor information even about who 
the bidders are (cf (4*)), all make an auction relatively more efficient and posted 
prices relatively less efficient.) 
Furthermore, there are several ways in which the antitrust of auctions and bidding 
processes can be a little different from usual, and sections 4 to 7 of this essay will 
consider these.  
Thus the remainder of this essay focuses on (all) those markets that satisfy 
assumption (5), ie involve a ‘bidding system’ or a ‘bidding process’.
21
3.  How auctions and bidding processes are like ‘ordinary’ markets 
The competition problems of auctions are broadly the same as those of ‘ordinary’ 
economic markets. Statements such as ‘in bidding markets … competition can be as 
vigorous with two firms as with three or more’ (Lexecon (1995))—cited approvingly in 
the South African Competition Tribunal’s recent decision permitting a ‘three-to-two’ 
merger
22—depend on the two firms being genuinely identical and genuinely 
competing, just as in an ‘ordinary’ (non-auction) market. If one firm is advantaged, eg 
by lower costs or reputation, it has market power; if firms are differentiated, both have 
market power; and even if they are identical, they can jointly exercise market power if 
they can coordinate. With more firms there are generally fewer problems, but 
problems are more likely if some or all of (1) to (4*) fail—all just as usual.
23  
3.1 Dominance 
As discussed above, especially when contracts are large and specialized, the winner 
of the current contract will often have a substantial advantage at the re-contracting 
stage, and new entry is likely to be hard and unattractive (ie (3) and (4*) are likely to 
fail). For example, after being the winner among eight bidders of the contest for the 
 
 
21I am reluctant to engage in further semantic issues by defining ‘bidding systems’ or ‘bidding processes’, but their important 
characteristic is ‘customer-by-customer pricing’ by contrast with an ordinary retail market in which a seller makes the same offer 
to many buyers. That is, when ‘bidders’ are sellers, each bidder generally treats each buyer separately and so makes a 
separate offer (or no offer) to each buyer. (Conversely, bidders who are buyers each make a separate offer to any seller they 
deal with.) The offer may be a price, or may include other dimensions. The offer may be improved, or refined, during the 
bidding process, perhaps in response to discussions or negotiations with the bid-taker (though a formal definition would 
probably exclude full-blown one-on-one bargaining in a bilateral monopoly). Assuming bidders are sellers, the buyer may be the 
final customer, or may (eg in an electricity pool) represent several final customers. However, as discussed above, the buyer 
may split her purchases between several bidders (contradicting (1)), may be one of many buyers (contradicting (2)) and may 
have substantial costs of switching sellers (contradicting (3)), and there may be significant costs of developing the capability to 
approach her with a credible bid (contradicting (4)).  
22 The merger of Murray & Roberts Ltd and The Cementation Company Ltd—see Competition Tribunal South Africa (2004). 
23The claim that one firm is enough for an optimal outcome is as highly sensitive as usual to (generally implausible) 
assumptions of speedy, costless, entry. As we noted above in our discussion of airline-ticket sales, whether or not the detailed 
process of price formation is an auction is sometimes completely unimportant. On the other hand, simplistically-measured past 
market shares may reflect market power even less accurately in auction markets than usual. Most obviously, if a ‘market’ 
consists of only a single winner-take-all contract, even symmetrically placed firms have ex-post shares of 0 per cent or 100 per 
cent (and it would be ridiculous to argue all possible mergers are therefore irrelevant). Measures of firms’ capabilities and 
capacities, perhaps summarized by their estimated ex-ante probabilities of winning a contest, or average shares over a longer 
history may be helpful. (Also if each bidding contest is, technically, a separate antitrust market, then ‘multi-market contact’ 
effects between these ‘separate’ markets supporting predation or collusion are particularly likely (Bernheim and Whinston 
(1990)).) 
 10seven-year monopoly franchise to run the UK National Lottery when it was founded 
in 1994, Camelot had developed substantial learning-by-doing and reputation 
advantages by the time of the subsequent contest in 2000. Not surprisingly there was 
far less competition (just two bids) in the second contest.
24   
This is just the standard problem of competition in markets with ‘switching costs’ as 
elaborated by eg Klemperer (1995), Farrell and Klemperer (forthcoming), Klemperer 
(forthcoming a). As those papers emphasize, this does not necessarily mean 
competition is weak or inefficient overall—the reduced second-stage competition can 
be compensated for by correspondingly fiercer first-stage competition that reflects the 
(quasi) rents that the first-stage winner expects to earn at the second-stage.
25 
However, as those papers also explain, the resulting bargain-then-ripoff offers that 
the buyer (or bid-taker) receives often do create inefficiencies, and make competition 
more fragile—for example, making predatory behaviour easier and more tempting. In 
the second National Lottery competition, the first-stage winner (Camelot) brought 
substantial public relations, legal, and other resources to bear in defeating its sole 
challenger (Virgin’s People’s Lottery), including successfully overturning the 
government’s initial decision to award the second franchise to the challenger,
26 and 
the experience of this has certainly had a chilling effect on the possibility of serious 
challenges emerging to contest the award of the third franchise due in 2006.
27
A distinction from the standard analysis of ‘switching cost’ markets is that the bid-
taker may have more control over the auction process than buyers have over the 
rules of competition in an ordinary market. However, this distinction is less important 
than it might seem, as we discuss later (section 6). The main message is that the 
ordinary economics of dominance applies.
28
3.2 Coordinated  effects 
Where entry is hard (ie (4*) fails), and especially when bidding is not winner-takes-all 
(ie (1) also fails), coordinated effects (ie tacit collusion) can emerge as easily in 
auctions and bidding processes as in ‘ordinary’ economic markets.
29 The standard 
kinds of repeated-game analysis apply, and the standard checklists of factors that 
competition authorities use worldwide remain appropriate for predicting the likely 
emergence of coordinated effects. The UK Competition Commission, for example, 
cites all of the following as facilitating coordination: few firms, high degree of market 
transparency, high frequency of firms’ interactions,
30 predictability of demand and 
costs, low likelihood of disruptive innovation, similarity of firms, lack of serious 
financial constraints on firms, long-term commitment of firms to the market, 
standardization of the product, inability of buyers to self-supply and difficulty of entry 
by new firms. 
 
 
24Arguably the surprise was that there was a second bidder at all. 
25So policy must consider whether observed current rents merely reflect a competitive return on past investments. 
26I am not suggesting that Camelot’s behaviour was in any way improper or that it contravened any laws or regulations. 
27Lock-in effects have been found to be important in what were claimed to be bidding markets in several recent cases before 
the UK Competition Commission. 
28In some cases a lock over the market may be jointly held by several firms. (This could perhaps be described as a case of 
‘joint dominance’, though the term is usually used in the context of concerns about collusion rather than exclusion.) For 
example, when in 2000 the Netherlands auctioned five 3G mobile-phone licenses it was very hard for any other bidder to 
compete with the five incumbent mobile-phone operators in the market, and the only new entrant that dared to bid was swiftly 
eliminated by what many described as predatory behaviour, so the auction raised less than one-third of what the winners 
valued the licences at. (See sections 5.2 and 6.2 below, and Klemperer (2002b, 2003a) for more details; in principle, the 
government’s control of the sales process should have allowed it to mitigate the problems; in practice, it exacerbated them.) 
29Explicit collusion is also common in auction markets. For example, according to McMillan (1991), two-thirds of the criminal 
cases brought by the US Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division during 1981 to 1988 involved bid-rigging by construction 
firms. 
30This feature is not explicitly in the UK Competition Commission’s list, but is implicit in its (and other agencies’) guidelines. 
 11It is no surprise, therefore, that the UK electricity (auction) market which satisfied 
almost the Competition Commission’s entire checklist
31 is suspected of having fallen 
prey to coordinated effects in the late 1990s.
 32 It may be that the specific auction 
rules contributed to the problems (see Klemperer (1999b, 2002a, 2003b)), and it was 
partly in response to this concern that the UK regulator introduced New Electricity 
Trading Arrangements (NETA) in 2001. However, it is clear that even with a more 
‘ordinary’ economic price-formation process the electricity market would be very 
vulnerable to coordinated effects as long as it satisfied so much of the Competition 
Commission’s checklist. Indeed, a common view is that the post-NETA fall in prices 
is much more due to the substantial reduction in market concentration that occurred 
around the same time than to the change in the market rules (see eg Newbery, 
2004). That is, the standard factors facilitating collusion mattered; replacing an 
auction by a more ‘ordinary’ price-setting process did not much matter. 
We will discuss below some special issues about how the details of auction-market 
rules can facilitate coordinated effects (and explicit collusion), in particular through 
creating the standard checklist conditions of market transparency, high frequency of 
firms’ interactions, and difficult entry. But the main message is that the fundamental 
issues are no different than in ‘ordinary’ markets. 
3.3 Unilateral  effects 
Just as for ordinary markets, several of the most important factors supporting 
coordinated effects including, especially, high concentration, lack of buyer power and 
difficulty of entry, also facilitate standard unilateral effects (ie monopolistic supply 
reduction or monopsonistic demand reduction). 
Thus, for example, while the extent to which electricity markets have suffered from 
coordinated effects can be debated, there is a broad array of evidence that they have 
at least suffered from the unilateral exercise of market power (see eg Wolfram (1998) 
on the UK electricity market, and Borenstein et al (2002), Joskow and Kahn (2002), 
and Wolak (2003) on the Californian market
33). 
To take another example, Cramton (2002) writes that in the 1994 US Nationwide 
Narrowband spectrum auction, ‘The largest bidder, PageNet [which he advised] 
reduced its demand from three of the large licences to two, at a point when prices 
were still well below its marginal valuation for the third unit. [It] felt that if it continued 
to demand a third licence, it would drive up the prices on all the others to 
disadvantageously high levels.’ This seems to have been unilateral behaviour, rather 
than (attempted) coordinated behaviour, since there is no suggestion or evidence 
that the bidder expected any other bidder to behave more co-operatively in response 
to its demand reduction, nor that any other bidder did so.
34 Cramton also provides 
 
 
31There were exceptions. For example, the firms were not all similar (though the relevant firms—ie the firms that had flexible 
capacity (not Nuclear Electric)—arguably were similar). 
32Sweeting (2004) finds that generator behaviour after 1996 was inconsistent with static Nash equilibrium and consistent with 
tacit collusion, Macatangay (2002) finds evidence of coordinated bidding patterns in 1996 to 1997, and Evans and Green 
(2003) also seems to support suspicions about coordinated effects. Similar suspicions have been voiced about the Spanish 
electricity market. See eg Fabra and Toro (forthcoming).  
33Tapes of telephone conversations obtained in the FBI’s investigation of Enron show the extreme way in which that company 
unilaterally exercised market power to raise prices, including arranging to shut down a power plant supplying energy to 
California on January 17, 2001 when blackouts affected up to a 0.5 million consumers (see Egan (2005)). 
More generally, ‘The many investigations of the causes of the California Electricity Crisis currently underway have not 
uncovered evidence that suggests suppliers coordinated their actions to raise prices in California’ (Wolak (2003)), suggesting 
that the significant market power effects that many studies have found for California in 2000 to 2001 were unilateral effects. 
34On the contrary, if there was any response, it seems to have been to try to persuade the largest bidder to reduce its demand 
further without any recompense. See also Cramton (1995). 
 12evidence of unilateral effects in the subsequent 1995 to 1996 ‘CBlock’ US spectrum 
auction. 
As usual, while auction-market rules may sometimes exacerbate some of the 
standard conditions supporting unilateral effects (for example, by making entry 
hard—see sections 4.3–4.4) the fundamental principles are the same as in ‘ordinary’ 
markets.
35
4.  Bidding rules and procedures 
Both the formalization of a bidding process into an auction with a small number of 
clearly defined rules, and those rules themselves, sometimes facilitate predatory 
and/or collusive strategies, especially in ascending auction processes, as we now 
discuss. 
4.1  Price formation in auctions and bidding processes 
Formal auctions 
When formal auction procedures are used, two basic designs of auction, and variants 
of these designs, are most common. The first basic design is the ascending auction, 
in which the price is raised successively until only one bidder remains, and that 
bidder wins the object at the final price she bid, as is common in sales of art and 
antiques.
36 The other standard design is the first-price sealed-bid or ‘pay your bid’ 
auction, in which each bidder independently submits a single bid without seeing 
others’ bids, the object is sold to the bidder who makes the highest bid, and the 
winner pays her bid, as is common in sales of oil or mineral rights, or in bidding for 
procurement contracts (although in the latter cases it is the low- rather than high-
bidder who is the winner).  
Informal bidding processes 
In more informal bidding processes, it may be unclear how best to think of the 
‘auction’. If a seller conducts parallel negotiations with two or more potential buyers 
simultaneously, this is probably in effect a standard ascending auction. But even in a 
so-called (first-price) sealed-bid auction, if the bidders repeatedly interact with the bid 
taker, asking ‘what kind of bid is likely to be successful?’, the process can mimic what 
an economist would call an ascending auction. Furthermore, bidders may not believe 
a nominally ‘sealed-bid’ process will end when the bids are opened: it is always in the 
bid taker’s interest to entertain further bids, and shareholders might sue him if he 
turns down a subsequent improved bid; disappointed bidders who would like a further 
bid may also bring legal proceedings.
37 Even if the bid taker originally attempted to 
precommit to not accepting further bids, reasons can usually be found why the 
original bidding failed to satisfy some rule, or why the situation has changed so 
 
 
35See Klemperer (2006) for further discussion. 
36Of course, this design becomes a descending one when the bidders are sellers. In this case the price is lowered until only one 
bidder remains and that bidder wins the object at the final price bid. For simplicity, we will continue to refer to such an auction 
as an ascending auction. 
37For example, the government commission’s original 2000 decision to award the UK National Lottery to a new-entrant bidder 
was overturned by a legal challenge from the incumbent which then won the contract after improving the terms of its offer. See 
section 3.1. 
See also the discussion of the proposed Manchester United/BSkyB combination in section 6.2. 
 13additional bids are needed.
38 And if bidders expect the process will later turn into an 
ascending auction, they will bid as if it was an ascending auction in the first place. 
On the other hand, superficially ascending processes may really be sealed bid. When 
bidding for a house you may not know whether you’ll get another chance to bid.
39 
When buying a car, you can in principle go back and forth between dealers soliciting 
improved offers, but in practice a dealer may refuse to put its offer in writing and so 
prevent you from credibly communicating it to a competitor; if so you are in effect 
running a sealed-bid contest. Sometimes when companies put themselves up for 
sale it is understood that there will be a series of rounds (even though these may all 
be called ‘final’), with the investment bankers talking up the price between rounds, 
but if there is no hard information about competitors’ bids until after a deal is sealed, 
only the final round really counts.
40
Bidding is closer to sealed-bidding if bidders are differentiated and the criteria for 
evaluating bids are not fully transparent, so that bidders would not necessarily know 
whose bid would win even if they were fully informed about others’ offers. 
Note that sealed-bidding corresponds to standard Bertrand price-setting. With perfect 
information, the sealed-bid process corresponds to Bertrand competition in a market 
in which all consumers make the same choice between firms. And, as noted above, 
with imperfect information about rivals’ costs or about the bid-taker’s preferences, 
bidders making sealed bids face a trade-off between the price and their expected 
sales that is similar to the price-quantity trade-off firms face in standard differentiated-
products Bertrand competition (and also similar to the similar trade-off in Cournot 
competition). 
Unfortunately, though our understanding of whether particular informal industrial 
bidding processes are best thought of as ascending or sealed-bid is often poor,
41 the 
distinction is also often crucial as we now discuss. 
4.2  Ascending auctions vs sealed-bid and ordinary markets I: efficiency 
A key distinction between ascending and sealed-bid auctions for a single fixed prize 
is that the efficient bidder generally wins an ascending auction, because if a high-
valuation bidder is initially outbid it can always raise its bid later. By contrast, a 
sealed-bid auction may be efficient when bidders are symmetric, but is not generally 
efficient.
42 The reason is that bidders cannot revise their initial bids, and a bidder with 
 
 
38For example, in the sale of RJR-Nabisco there were several successive rounds of supposedly-final sealed-bids: after the first 
set of ‘final’ sealed-bids had been opened (and revealed to all), an extension was arranged to allow a bidder time to clarify 
some details of its offer prior to a second ‘final’ round of sealed-bids; one of the losers in this second round then submitted and 
made public a further, unsolicited, higher bid to pressure the board into reopening the sale, and yet more bids then followed as 
the process degenerated into something more closely resembling an ascending auction (see Burrough and Helyar (1990, pp 
415–6, 479–502)). 
39Agents may have little incentive to extend the process, preferring to manage the matching of buyers and sellers than to 
maximize price on any one transaction (in the UK agents typically receive 1.5 per cent of the transaction price and it can be 
hard to arrange higher-powered incentives), or a competing bidder may credibly make a take-it-or-leave-it offer (which seems 
more common in the real world than the current theoretical literature can easily explain). 
40As a demonstration of this, I have heard of sales in which the winner’s final bid exceeded its initial bid, and its initial bid 
exceeded all subsequent competitive bids. 
41Interestingly, when reviewing the recent merger between Oracle and PeopleSoft, the US Department of Justice and the 
European Commission came to quite different views on whether the bidding process was best described as an ascending 
auction or as a sealed-bid auction. It seems the two authorities (which both originally opposed the transaction) had differing 
views on whether buyers could be believed when they told competing bidders what the other bidder(s) had offered. So the US 
Department of Justice (which felt buyers could credibly report bidders’ offers) did modelling based on the assumption that sales 
were ascending auctions, while the European Commission (which felt buyers couldn't do this) looked at studies that modelled 
the sales processes as sealed-bid auctions. (See European Commission, 2004; US et al. v Oracle Corporation.) 
42In reality the strategic uncertainty induced by a sealed-bid auction means that it may not be efficient even with symmetric 
bidders. This probably does not affect our argument. 
 14a lower valuation may therefore win at a price that a bidder with a higher valuation 
could have beaten but did not because it was hoping to win more cheaply. Likewise 
‘ordinary’ economic markets that are not ‘winner-take-all’ are typically inefficient, 
because less efficient firms typically make some sales. 
Thus, for example, a merger that makes an industry asymmetric may be less socially 
desirable if prices are set in sealed-bid auctions or in ‘ordinary’ economic markets, 
than if prices are set in ascending auctions.
43 However, a regulator who (like most 
antitrust regulators) cares about consumer welfare rather than efficiency may have 
the opposite preferences, since bid-taker surplus is the same under the two auctions 
if bidders are symmetric but is often higher in a sealed-bid auction if bidders are 
asymmetric (see Maskin and Riley (2000)). (Put differently, efficiency savings of 
asymmetry-creating mergers are more likely to be passed through to bid-takers in the 
sealed-bid case.) Furthermore if the auction reveals information that improves the 
efficiency of the sealed-bid auction (perhaps merely by sharing information between 
the merging partners), both efficiency-maximising and consumer surplus-maximising 
regulators may be more enthusiastic about mergers when prices are set in sealed-bid 
auctions than when they are set in ascending auctions. 
However, one suspects that these direct efficiency effects on the relative 
attractiveness of mergers in different auction regimes, and further results that can be 
developed along these lines,
44 are much less important than the indirect effects to 
which we now turn. 
4.3  Ascending auctions vs sealed-bid and ordinary markets II: entry 
Because ascending auctions are always won by the strongest party, it is also often 
known who that winner will be. There is then no incentive for any other bidders to 
turn up—a disastrous outcome for the bid-taker, especially if he does not have the 
ability to set a reserve price (perhaps because he lacks the information). 
Klemperer (2002a) provides several examples of this—for example, Glaxo’s 1995 
takeover of Wellcome without serious competition, and for literally billions of dollars 
less than its valuation, after the largest shareholder in the target company had made 
commitments that forced the sales process to be essentially an ascending auction. 
By contrast, entry is more attractive into a sealed-bid auction in which there is usually 
some uncertainty about who the winner will be,
45 or into an ‘ordinary’ economic 
market in which a slightly-inferior firm may win an only slightly-inferior market share.
46 
Klemperer (1999a,b, 2002a, 2003a) and Bulow and Klemperer (1996) argue that this 
is a crucial issue in auction design—see also section 6.1.  
Furthermore, since entry into an ascending auction can be deterred by even a small 
disadvantage, entry deterring and predatory strategies of reducing one’s own costs, 
or raising rivals’ costs, or making threatening statements, can all be far more 
profitable than in a sealed-bid auction, or in an ‘ordinary’ economic market. Indeed a 
                                                                                                                                                     
Pure common value auctions are an exception, since any allocation is efficient. See section 5. 
43In this discussion we assume mergers do not affect the price-formation process. 
44Marshall et al (1994), Dalkir, Logan and Masson (2000) and Tschantz, Crooke and Froeb (2000) make detailed comparisons 
of the price effects of mergers in sealed-bid and ascending auctions, assuming particular functional forms for distributions of 
valuations. However, the results are sensitive to the functional forms assumed. Changing the functional forms can reverse the 
relative magnitudes of the price effects of mergers in sealed-bid and ascending auctions. So the suggestion (Froeb and Shor 
(2000)) that we use the magnitude of the effect in an ascending auction as an upper bound for the magnitude of the effect in a 
sealed-bid auction may be risky. 
45But sealed-bid auctions may discourage potential bidders who have only small amounts to trade, because such bidders need 
better information about their rivals to bid intelligently than they would need in ascending or uniform-price auctions, and the 
costs of obtaining good information might not be worth their paying (see Klemperer (2002a)). 
46As in, for example, a Cournot market, or a Bertrand market with heterogeneous consumers without price discrimination.  
 15common tactic for an incumbent or otherwise advantaged firm is to attempt to 
(re)structure the bidding process as an ascending auction.
47,48  
4.4  Formal rules facilitate communication 
One of the biggest problems faced by firms who wish to collude or predate is how to 
signal their intentions to rivals when ordinary communication is illegal. Unfortunately 
for regulators, the formal rules of auctions often solve firms’ problem by defining a 
‘language’ that bidders can use to communicate with each other. Klemperer (2002a) 
gives many examples, including a multi-license US spectrum auction in 1996 to 
1997, in which US West was competing vigorously with McLeod for lot number 378—
a license in Rochester, Minnesota. Although most bids in the auction had been in 
exact thousands of dollars, US West bid $313,378 and $62,378 for two licenses in 
Iowa in which it had earlier shown no interest, overbidding McLeod, who had seemed 
to be the uncontested high-bidder for these licenses. McLeod got the point that it was 
being punished for competing in Rochester, and dropped out of that market. Since 
McLeod made subsequent higher bids on the Iowa licenses, the ‘punishment’ bids 
cost US West nothing (see Cramton and Schwartz, 2000).
49
Thus clear rules permit clear communication, and so facilitate both predatory and 
collusive behaviour. 
Furthermore, auctions like the one described provide a rich enough vocabulary to 
communicate without providing too much. A simple single (sealed) bid auction would 
have made the behaviour described impossible; an ascending auction with fixed 
increments (eg each new bid must be exactly 10 per cent higher than the bid it is 
beating) would have made it very hard.
50 On the other hand an ‘ordinary’ market with 
many different strategies available to firms may yield too rich a vocabulary for clear 
communication. For example, it is very hard for consumer-goods retailers who are 
selling hundreds of products, many of which are at least slightly differentiated from 
their rivals’ products, and who can also follow different strategies in advertising, 
service quality etc, to communicate suggestions about how to coordinate prices or 
divide markets, and to monitor whether their rivals are sticking to tacit agreements, 
without breaking the laws prohibiting explicit communication.
 51
Although the problems are worst for ascending auctions they are not restricted to 
them. For example, in repeated sealed-bid auctions the clearly defined history of past 




47For example, governments are often lobbied heavily for ascending auction processes for this reason. The 2001 Hong Kong 
3G auction is just one example in which the government disastrously gave in to this lobbying (see section 6.2). 
48Note, therefore, that the US Robinson-Patman Act that outlaws price discrimination where this ‘reduces competition’, and is 
generally thought to be intended to protect weaker competitors, is less well designed for this purpose than often assumed. The 
exemption in the Act that allows a firm (eg a large firm or an incumbent) that has previously made sales at a higher price to 
discount its price to meet the price of a competitor (eg a small firm or new entrant), but not to beat the competitor’s price, 
essentially permits the large firm to compete in an ascending auction contest, but would rule out its participation in a sealed-bid 
contest (or at least put the large firm in a very weak position since it could not take the risk of beating its rival by more than a 
trivial margin). If the Act really wished to encourage smaller firms, it should instead make ascending auctions hard for larger 
firms to participate in, but encourage ‘sealed-bid’ sales processes that favour weaker firms.  
49For another example of bidders using their bids to signal to each other see footnote 54. 
50It might still have been possible for US West to signal the same message by overbidding on the Iowa licenses whenever 
McLeod bid on Rochester. But is would certainly have been harder for US West to be confident its message was understood; 
perhaps McLeod would have pretended not to understand and, without common knowledge that its message was understood, 
US West might have given up trying to communicate in this way. 
51Note that communication is made harder when firms have incentive to feign at least partial misunderstanding of their rivals. 
This is often the case (and was certainly the case in the US West/McLeod example discussed above). 
52For example, the kind of price coordination that has been alleged about some concentrated electricity markets might perhaps 
arise in any repeated single-bid auction, including pay-your-bid and uniform price auctions. 
 16Thus a key distinction between a bidding process with formal rules and an ‘ordinary’ 
market is that the formality of the rules itself makes market behaviour much more 
transparent, and so much more vulnerable to competition problems. 
4.5  Ascending auctions vs sealed-bid and ordinary markets III: collusion 
One-off markets 
Where ascending auctions clearly allow more strategic behaviour than single-bid 
auctions or ordinary markets is in ‘one-off’ markets that will never be repeated. 
Because an ascending auction turns a one-off market into a multi-stage game, it 
permits complex interactions and communications between bidders that would be 
impossible in a one-shot game. A good example is the behaviour in Iowa described 
in the previous subsection; see Klemperer (2002a) for more examples.
54
It is important to observe, however, that the reason ascending auctions encourage 
anti-competitive behaviour is that they create the standard conditions that facilitate it. 
This is clearly seen in that they provide easy answers to the four problems that firms 
must solve in order to support collusion in an ordinary industrial market—these 
problems are listed in, for example, the European Commission’s current (2004) 
merger guidelines, and in standard industrial organization textbooks:  
(1) How can firms reach agreement on a division of the market?  
(2) How can they monitor adherence to the agreement?  
(3) How can they credibly punish any observed deviation from the agreement?  
(4) How can they deter non-participants in the agreement from entering the industry?  
In terms of the checklist of section 3.2, ascending auctions make the market very 
transparent helping to solve problems (1) and (2) much more effectively than in an 
‘ordinary’ industrial market whose definition may not be obvious, so in which efficient 
agreements are unclear, and in which defection is often ambiguous and slow to 
observe. Ascending auctions enormously increase the frequency of interaction,
 55 so 
bids can be used to signal proposals about how to divide the ‘pie’, to signal 
agreement with others’ proposals, and to quickly and easily punish defectors,
 helping 
to solve problems (1) and (3) (especially since punishing a defector by raising price 
only on objects it will win, as in Iowa—see section 4.4—is costless to the punisher). 
And ascending auctions help deter entry, solving problem (4) (see section 4.3).
56  
To a limited extent similar strategic behaviour is possible in other auctions and 
‘ordinary’ one-off markets. For example, by offering ‘meet the competition’ clauses 
(MCCs) or ‘we will never be undersold’ promises which guarantee rebates to any 
customer who finds a better price at a rival, firms can sustain collusive prices in a 
one-shot game—in effect MCCs introduce a dynamic component into the game by 
                                                                                                                                                     
53Fabra (2003) argues that collusion is easier in repeated uniform-price multi-unit auctions than in repeated discriminatory multi-
unit auctions. See also footnote 61. 
54[Another favourite example of bidders’ ability to ‘collude’ in a ‘one-off’ ascending auction was provided by the 1999 German 
DCS-1800 auction: ten blocks of spectrum were sold, with the rule that any new bid on a block had to exceed the previous high 
bid by at least 10 per cent. There were just two credible bidders: the two largest German mobile-phone companies, T-Mobil and 
Mannesman; and Mannesman's first bids were DM18.18 million per megahertz on blocks one to five and DM20 million per MHz 
on blocks six to ten. T-Mobil—who bid even less in the first round—later said ‘There were no agreements with Mannesman. But 
[we] interpreted Mannesman's first bid as an offer.’ (Stuewe, 1999, p.13). The point is that 18.18 plus a 10 per cent raise equals 
20.00. Clearly T-Mobil understood that if it bid DM20 million per MHz on blocks one to five, but did not bid again on blocks six to 
ten, the two companies would then live and let live with neither company challenging the other on the other's half. Exactly that 
happened. So the auction closed after just two rounds with each of the bidders acquiring half the blocks for the same low price, 
which was a small fraction of the valuations that the bidders actually placed on the blocks. 
55And so also mean that simply being in the one-off market is as good as a ‘long-term commitment’, in terms of the checklist of 
section 3.2. 
56At a more formal level, Grimm, Riedel and Wolfstetter (2002) argue that the rules of ascending auctions turn the outcomes of 
one-shot oligopolistic games that we call ‘collusive’ into non-cooperative Nash equilibria of repeated oligopoly games. Grimm et 
al demonstrate this point in the context of the 1999 German DCS-1800 auction described in footnote 54. 
 17promising a reaction in the event an opponent deviates from a tacitly-understood 
agreement. However, MCCs cannot help firms signal or negotiate what that 
agreement might be (at least in a one-off context). And a MCC is also risky if you 
may face an opponent who has very low costs. 
Likewise in uniform-price multi-unit auctions (in which all the units are sold at the 
(same) price that equates supply and demand), bidders can in principle achieve 
collusive prices as an ‘implicitly collusive’ equilibrium by choosing bids that would 
result in very competitive outcomes in the out-of-equilibrium event that the opponents 
fail to cooperate in the collusion.
57 Again, however, it is unclear how in a one-off 
market bidders can agree what the collusive shares should be, and the strategy is 
very vulnerable to opponents’ mistakes in understanding these shares or to 
additional bidders entering unexpectedly. So the existence of these equilibria in 
theoretical models is probably more relevant in practice to assisting collusion in 
repeated markets than to allowing it in actual one-off markets.
58
However, the greater danger of collusion in one-off ascending auction markets can 
also be exaggerated. Coordinated effects are harder with more firms, or less similar 
firms (see section 3.2), and bidders often seem more imaginative in their attempts to 
signal than in their understanding of others’ signals—as usual, something is much 
more obvious after it has been explained.
59,60 Even with ascending auctions, it is 
much harder to build up mutual understanding in a one-off market than in a regularly 
repeated one. Finally, as we discuss in section 6.1, even minor modifications to an 
ascending auction’s rules can often reduce the risk of collusion. 
Market division 
Bidding processes may also facilitate collusive market division by turning a one-shot 
game for a whole market into a long series of individual customer-specific contests.
 61 
Especially when all bids are observable, this may make it much easier to segment 
the market, eg allocating customers geographically,
  though firms may, to some 
extent, be able to achieve similar segmentation in an ‘ordinary’ market through price-
discrimination. 
How many bidders are enough? 
It is often asked, ‘How many bidders are enough to make a market competitive?’ The 
answer is no clearer than in an ‘ordinary’ market, but experience suggests that 
(contrary to the simple theory of ‘bidding markets’—see section 2.1) one more bidder 
than the number of prizes is not enough in an ascending auction, even in a one-off 
auction in which bidders can win at most one prize each (so there is no question of 
colluding to divide the prizes). For example, in the year 2000, Netherlands’ 3G 
(ascending) auction in which six bidders competed for five licenses, the auction 
 
 
57For example, if two buyers each bid very high prices for less than half the available quantity, but low prices for half or more, 
then each buyer receives half the quantity at the low price, and both players would be worse off if either player deviated to bid 
more aggressively for more than half the quantity. 
58Sade, Schnitzlein, and Zender (2004) have found collusion to be no more common in experimental markets that use uniform-
price auctions than those that use discriminatory auctions—in fact they find the contrary. 
59It is often entertaining to hear after an auction what bidders thought they were communicating. Though I’m not sure I fully 
believe the southern European bidding team who explained that its bid in a major auction had an obvious interpretation from 
the Bible, the dumbfounded and horrified reactions of the northern European consultants who had spent considerable effort 
trying to decode the bid at the time were a treat to behold. Culture matters. 
60Another problem is when there is more than one bidder who thinks it is, or should be, the leader coordinating the others. See 
Klemperer (2002d, 2003a). 
61The theoretical literature on collusion in repeated auctions (Blume and Heidhues (mimeo, 2002), Aoyagi (2003), Skrzypacz 
and Hopenhayn (2004), McAfee and McMillan (1992)) shows how schemes such as bid-rotation (in which firms take turns to 
submit the winning bid) can achieve collusive outcomes in the absence of side transfers between bidders. 
 18finished early raising less than one-third the revenue expected, after what many 
interpreted as predatory behaviour that eliminated a bidder (see section 5.2 and 
Klemperer (2002b, 2003a)). Similarly the Italian 3G (ascending) auction held just 
three months later, also with six bidders for five licenses, collapsed almost as soon 
as it had begun amid allegations of collusion and with a proportionately similar loss of 
government revenue (see Klemperer (2002b)).
62,63
5. Common  values 
Auctions and bidding processes are often used precisely because different 
participants have different, and poor, information—auctions are famously good at 
efficiently aggregating and using dispersed information, while with perfect information 
using posted prices is more straightforward. But if competitors have information or 
opinions about the value of winning a contract or prize that would be useful to other 
competitors, this creates ‘common values’. In particular, a bidder wins the prize only 
when it has very optimistic information about its value (indeed in symmetric 
equilibrium it wins the prize only when it has the highest signal)—this is the ‘winner's 
curse’. Failure to take into account the bad news about others’ signals that comes 
with any victory would lead to the winner paying more, on average, than the prize is 
worth. So bidders adjust their bids downwards (in either sealed-bid or ascending 
auctions) to allow for the winner’s curse.  
It is sometimes argued that ‘winner’s curse’ issues reduce competition problems. 
However, while they may perhaps mitigate the problems of collusion (this is 
unclear—see below), they certainly do not negate them. Indeed, overall, the 
existence of common values is probably an argument for stronger rather than weaker 
competition policy. 
Furthermore, in many cases it is hard to distinguish whether or not an auction or 
market is common or private values—that is, from a given bidder’s perspective does 
other bidders’ private information relate to others’ valuations, or also to this bidder’s 
actual valuation?
64 Moreover, even if the situation is truly common values, do bidders 
bid as if others’ information matters to them?, or do they bid as if there were private 
values? If the latter, then any common value effects are even less important. 
5.1  Common values and collusion 
It is well understood that the more competitors a bidder faces, the greater is the 
winner’s curse, (ie the worse is the news from winning) and so the more the bidder 
must adjust his bid to account for the curse. So if a subset of bidders colludes it faces 
a lesser curse from winning and therefore, it is argued, it may bid more aggressively 
 
 
62The lost revenue was similar per head of population. The sets of bidders were different in the two auctions, and there is no 
suggestion that there was any important connection between these auctions (though Klemperer (2002b) argues that bidders did 
learn how to ‘play the game’ better through the course of the European 3G auctions more generally). 
63On a personal note, it has sometimes been put to me that the investment bankers who advised on the UK’s 3G auction (which 
I, together with Ken Binmore, designed) had no useful role. But I believe they performed (at least) a very valuable marketing job 
in persuading 13 bidders to compete for the UK’s five licences. Though some of the bidders seemed unlikely winners even at 
the time, 13 bidders were enough that neither predation nor collusion was a realistic strategy. (See Binmore and 
Klemperer (2002).) 
64It is often difficult to distinguish private values from common values even based on ex-post bidding data. See, for example, 
Laffont and Vuong (1996), and Pinkse and Tan (2005). However, there are some econometric tests, see, eg Armantier (2002), 
Athey and Haile (2002), Haile, Hong, and Shum (2004), Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003) and Paarsch (1992) (see also 
Bulow and Klemperer (2002) for some relevant theory), and some empirical literature distinguishes the different contexts. For 
example, Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter provide evidence that oil and gas leases (where rivals have private information about 
yields) are mostly common value assets. Construction contracts (where rivals have private information about costs) are also 
typically thought to be largely common values. Purchases for resale may also have large common-value components. 
 19and raise bid-taker surplus. So, it is contended, bid-takers gain from bidders’ 
collusion! But although bids are adjusted less for the winner’s curse, this effect is 
offset both by the reduced winner’s curse, and by the standard loss-of-competition 
effects; ceteris paribus (absent winner’s curse effects), bidders with fewer 
competitors bid less aggressively, and even if they bid equally aggressively, the 
winning bid among fewer bidders is on average less aggressive. While the details of 
functional forms are crucial, the simplest examples suggest mergers with common 
values are as anticompetitive as mergers with private values:
65
First, consider the ‘maximum game’ introduced by Bulow and Klemperer (2002) in 
which each bidder, i, initially receives a signal, ti, and the actual common-value, v, of 
the single prize is the maximum of these signals, ie v=ma . x{ } i i t
66 In the symmetric 
equilibrium of an ascending auction, each bidder drops out at his own signal. After 
any mergers, a merged entity behaves as if it had a signal equal to the maximum of 
all its signals. Clearly revenue is unaltered unless the bidders with the two highest 
signals happened to merge in which case revenue falls to equal the highest signal 
not held by the winner. Note that the results are identical to those of a pure private-
value model in which each bidder’s actual value is ti, and a merged entity’s actual 
value is the maximum of the values held by its constituents.
67
A second example is provided by the ‘wallet game’ introduced by Bulow and 
Klemperer (1997) and Klemperer (1998), in which the actual common value of the 
single prize is the sum of all the signals, ie v= i
i
t ∑ . Here too, it is very easy to show 
that mergers that result in two firms each holding half the signals reduce bid-taker 
surplus,
68 and Mares and Shor (2004) extend this to show that any sequence of 
mergers that results in a symmetric industry structure reduces bid-taker surplus.
69 
These results hold for both ascending and sealed-bid auctions.
70 Analysing mergers 
that yield asymmetric industry structures is much harder, but those results that are 
available suggest that here too mergers reduce bid-taker surplus with common 
values, just as with private values.




65Hendricks, Porter, and Tan (2003) show that joint-bidding consortia are less likely to be formed in common-values contests, 
since bidders who think they have good information may prefer to bid non-cooperatively than to share their possible gains with 
less-informed rivals. A positive interpretation of this result is that any consortium is likely to reflect strong efficiency benefits. A 
negative interpretation is that it may have been formed for its entry-deterring effects (see below and section  5.2—
Hendricks et al ignore the effects of joint-bidding on further entry). A neutral interpretation is that if we do observe a consortium, 
the auction is more likely to be private values than common values. 
66This model, or an approximation to it, may be appropriate when bidding for mineral rights, if a positive signal ‘finding gold’ 
makes all other prospecting results irrelevant. Harstad and Bordley (1996) and Parlour and Rajan (2005) present more complex 
models with very similar properties to the ‘maximum game’. 
67These results extend to sealed-bid auctions for mergers that result in a symmetric industry structure (when bidders are risk-
neutral and their information signals are independent), by an elementary application of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. 
68In the symmetric equilibrium, the last bidder to drop out quits at what the actual value would be, if the actual winner’s signal 
were in fact tied with his own. Thus, writing t(i) for the actual i
th highest signal, before any mergers the winner’s profit is t(1) – t(2) 
and expected auction revenue is  . Post-mergers, each firm's private information is represented by the sum of its 
signals and each firm again bids up to what the actual value would be if its opponent were tied with it, so the winning firm's 
profit is the difference between the sum of its signals and the sum of its opponent's signals. Then, conditional on t
(1) (2) ( Ev t t ⎡ −− ⎣
(1) and t(2) 
being held by separate merged firms, let the sums of all the other signals held by these two merged firms be S1 and S2 , 
respectively, so expected seller revenue is { } (1) 1 (2) 2 () () Ev < t S t S −+ −+ { } { } (1) 1 (2) 2 (1) (2) (( ) ( )) ( ) . Ev t S t S Ev t t −+ −+ =− −  Of course, 
conditional on t(1) and t(2) being held by the same firm, the expected difference between the winning firm's information and the 
losing firm's information is even higher, so expected seller revenue is even lower.  
69Mares and Shor assume nm bidders, each of which owns a single signal, merge to create n firms, each of which owns m 
signals. 
70The extension to sealed-bid auctions is an elementary application of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem; we assume bidders 
are risk-neutral, that their information signals are independent, and that they play the symmetric equilibrium in an ascending 
auction.  
71For sealed-bid auctions, see Klemperer (forthcoming b). For ascending auctions, a general analysis is hard because there is a 
multiplicity of equilibria, and is hard to pick it among them after a merger that leaves bidders asymmetric. However, Pagnozzi 
 20Of course, all these results contrast with those of Bulow and Klemperer (2002) who 
show that reducing the number of bidders by simply excluding some of them always 
raises bid-taker surplus in the ‘maximum’ game, and often does so in the ‘wallet’ 
game. The crucial difference is that Bulow and Klemperer assume excluding bidders 
also excludes their private information from being used in the bidding, whereas a 
consortium (joint) bidder retains and uses all the information of the constituent 
bidders. In common-value auctions, the bidders’ rents reflect the expected difference 
in information between the winner and the runner up, so if reducing participation 
excludes particularly valuable private information it can reduce the difference 
between bidders’ information and so increase bid-taker surplus. By contrast, joint 
bidding hurts the bid-taker if it increases the differences in private information 
available to different bidders by giving different merged bidders access to more 
different signals. Indeed the most profitable strategy for an uninformed bid-taker is to 
exclude all bidders and sell to a completely uninformed bidder who will be willing to 
bid the full expected value of the prize; a very unprofitable strategy is to allow all the 
informed bidders to combine, even if you can make them a take-it-or-leave-it offer. 
Nonetheless, it is not surprising that Bulow and Klemperer’s (2002) work (and 
empirical support for it in, eg Hong and Shum (2002)) has been misinterpreted as 
suggesting a possible merit of joint bidding in common-value auctions.
72
Other previous papers also seem to have been misinterpreted as suggesting 
common values mean joint bidding is less damaging than usual: 
Hoffman et al’s (1991) and Hendricks and Porter’s (1992) empirical work emphasizes 
that joint-bidding in common-value oil-industry auctions allows informed bidders more 
access to capital, so bid-takers could gain. But with private values or in ‘ordinary’ 
(non-auction) markets, also, a joint venture can be pro-competitive if it relaxes capital 
constraints, and Hendricks and Porter’s evidence suggests joint bidding may also 
increase bidder rents, just as in ordinary markets, for the usual reduction of 
competition reasons (Hendricks and Porter, 1992 p511). 
In a similar vein, de Brock and Smith (1983) present a theoretical example in which 
joint bidding rarely reduces the bid-taker’s surplus very much, and for some 
parameterizations actually increases it. But in their example there are (social) 
efficiency gains from mergers, because bidders’ improved information means oil 
tracts are developed more efficiently. So, again, this is nothing new. This is very 
similar to the standard argument that an R&D joint venture that pools information 
efficiently can both be socially beneficial and can benefit consumers (or benefit bid-
takers in a private-values auction). Indeed in de Brock and Smith’s example, mergers 
always increase bidders’ expected profits and, just as in ‘ordinary’ markets, the anti-
competitive effect of increased market power can only be outweighed by the 
efficiency effects if the industry is sufficiently unconcentrated. (In their examples the 
bid-taker is always left worse off unless at least ten(!) bidders remain after the 
merger.)  
Perhaps there are greater information-pooling and/or capital-constraint-relaxing 
benefits of mergers in common-value auctions than in private-value auctions or 
‘ordinary’ markets, because common-value issues are driven by poor and different 
information and so also firms may face greater risks. On the other hand, in a 
                                                                                                                                                     
(2004a) argues that the result that mergers are anti-competitive generalizes to asymmetric cases by analyzing the game as the 
limit of an ‘almost common-value model’.   
72Further confusion has resulted from an influential paper by Krishna and Morgan (1997) which made valuable contributions to 
the study of common-value auctions, but also contended that joint bidding could benefit bid-takers in wallet-games. 
Unfortunately that part of their paper was flawed, and joint bidding cannot benefit bid-takers in Krishna and Morgan’s model, as 
Mares and Shor (2004) demonstrated. Furthermore, Levin (2004) showed that in multi-unit auctions it is even more likely that 
joint bidding hurts the bid-taker.  
 21common-value auction it is a matter of social indifference who wins,
73 whereas in 
ordinary markets mergers that transfer more output to lower cost firms (as is usually 
the case) are socially beneficial. So, on balance, efficiency benefits of mergers may 
be more likely in ‘ordinary’ markets.
74  
Some other arguments also suggest joint bidding may be more deleterious in 
common-value than in private-value auctions: if participants underestimate the 
common-value effects, or otherwise fail to compensate sufficiently for them, they will 
lose more from the winner’s curse the more bidders there are, so in practice 
common-value effects may exacerbate (and certainly not reduce) the costliness to 
bid-takers of collusion or mergers. Furthermore, the strategy of incumbents merging 
to strengthen themselves and prevent the entry of further rivals may be particularly 
effective in common-value contexts (see next sub-section).
75
Mares and Shor’s (2004) experiments provide further evidence that joint bidding 
hurts bid-takers in common-value auctions. 
Finally, and crucially, and far more significant than the issue of joint bidding when 
some competition remains, is the issue of joint bidding or collusion among all bidders. 
A very real danger is that (just as in private-value contests) the more joint bidding is 
permitted, the easier it is for industry-wide collusion to develop.  
In sum, while these issues are still not well understood, the current evidence is that 
joint bidding is unlikely to be much more benign in common-value auctions than in 
private-value auctions or in ‘ordinary’ markets. 
5.2  Common values and predation 
With ‘almost common values’, that is, in common-value cases in which one bidder is 
slightly stronger than the other(s), the disadvantages of weaker bidders in ascending 
auctions that we discussed in section 4.3 are exacerbated by the winner’s curse 
effects. 
The reason is that winning against a bidder whose value of winning is greater than 
yours is even worse news than usual about the opponent’s valuation of the prize; so 
you must bid extra cautiously. And because he knows you are being extra cautious, 
beating you is not very bad news for him about your valuation; so he need not worry 
much about the winner’s curse and can bid more aggressively than if you and he 
were symmetrically placed. So the effect is self reinforcing—because the weak 
bidder faces a very severe winner’s curse and is bidding extra cautiously, the 
advantaged bidder faces very little winner’s curse and is bidding extra aggressively. 
This substantially reduces bid-taker surplus even if entry to the auction is unaffected. 
Moreover, since the weaker bidder’s potential profits from bidding are so low, it may 
also be discouraged from even entering, further hurting the bid-taker. 
Thus antitrust policy must be more careful than usual to protect against actions that 
magnify weaker bidders’ disadvantages in ascending auctions. Such actions may 
include mergers. For example, prior to the Netherlands 3G auction in 2000 of five 
 
 
73Of course, this also means that if we care about social welfare rather than about bid-taker’s or consumers’ welfare, we should 
not care about mergers in pure common-value auctions. 
74In winner-take-all, sealed-bid, private-value auctions, efficiency can be increased or decreased by mergers. See section 4.2. 
75Of course, it also follows that a merger that combines two weak bidders, and thereby reduces the difference between the 
amount of private information available to the resulting (merged) bidder and the amount of private information available to a 
stronger bidder, could be particularly desirable in preventing the entry-deterring and predatory possibilities discussed in the 
next sub-section. This parallels the result that in a ‘normal market’, a merger may create a more effective competitor to an 
otherwise-dominant firm. 
 22licences (which, for good technological and antitrust reasons, were indivisible and 
had each to be won by a different firm), there were four strong incumbent 2G 
operators and one weaker incumbent 2G operator (Ben). There were also a number 
of potential entrants, of whom Deutsche Telekom (DT) was particularly strong since it 
was both financially unconstrained and had potential synergies with its substantial 
operations in neighbouring Germany. Since even the weak incumbent had some 
advantages, based on past sunk investments in technology, base stations, customer 
loyalty and brand-name recognition, there might have been a competitive auction if 
Ben and DT had bid independently. But after Ben merged with DT it seemed very 
clear who the five winners would be, and only one of the remaining potential entrants 
bothered to bid.
 76 Furthermore, that remaining entrant only bid weakly, and gave up 
altogether after being discouraged by further actions that some argued were 
predatory and deserved government investigation. The result was a disaster for the 
bid-taker (the Netherlands’ government) which earned less than one-third of the 
revenue that a well-managed process could have yielded.  
The Netherlands’ ascending auction design would have made it unattractive to 
potential entrants even absent the special common-value considerations. But the 
common-value issues seem to have exacerbated this problem, and they also greatly 
increased the disadvantages faced by the one new entrant who did bid.
77 (See 
Klemperer (2002b, 2003a) for further details.)  
Although the most obvious advantage one bidder might have over another is a higher 
valuation for the prize, other possible advantages include a commitment to maintain 
a reputation for aggressive bidding (Bikhchandani (1988)), or a small ownership 
stake, or ‘toehold’, in the prize being competed for (which provides an incentive to 
push the price up further than otherwise—see Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999)). 
Klemperer (1998) gives details and examples.
78
The UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) took this last issue very 
seriously when it blocked BSkyB (the leading UK satellite television company) from 
acquiring Manchester United (then Europe’s leading football club) in 1999.
79 The 
concern was that Manchester United received 7  per cent of the Premiership’s 
television revenues which were sold as a bundle in an ascending auction. Acquiring 
this 7 per cent ‘toehold’ in the prize would have made BSkyB most likely to win the 
auction, and ownership of the football television rights would have reinforced 
BSkyB’s market power in the pay-television market.
 80  
One argument against the MMC’s decision was that if bidders behaved as if the 
auction was private values, the auction would have been much less affected because 
the logic given at the beginning of the subsection only fully applies if participants 
understand it and believe it. With private values, or if bidders behave as if there are 
private values, a small advantage of the right kind may still deter entry, but otherwise 
may not much affect the auction, by contrast with the common-values case, in which 
 
 
76In addition to Deutsche Telekom, Hutchison had also been considered a strong potential entrant, but it also entered a 
partnership with an incumbent (KPN). Other potential entrants were also co-opted into joint-ventures with incumbents, or 
dropped out altogether.  
77The common-value issues were sufficiently important and well-understood that they were discussed in the press in advance 
of the Netherlands’ auction. Although this auction might have been uncompetitive even without common values, the anti-trust 
concern we describe below (caused by the proposed BSkyB-Manchester United merger) would probably not have been an 
issue at all, absent common values.  
78Levin and Kagel (2005) show that the effects can be smaller, though still important, when there are more than two bidders. 
79See MMC (MMC) (1999). Prior to 2003, the MMC (the predecessor body to the Competition Commission) could only make 
recommendations, so this decision was technically a recommendation, but it was accepted by the government. 
80Though the theories discussed in the MMC’s decision appealed to my papers Klemperer (1998), Bulow, Huang, and 
Klemperer (1999), I did not discuss the case with the MMC or with any interested party before the decision (which was prior to 
my appointment as a Member of the Competition Commission). 
 23not only is entry even more likely to be deterred, but a small advantage creates a 
much less competitive auction. However, the MMC took the view that while bidder 
behaviour might not be as extreme as in the theoretical models, the common-values 
aspect would make BSkyB’s rivals at least somewhat more cautious.
81 Sadly, the 
prominence given to my papers, Klemperer (1998), and Bulow, Huang, and 
Klemperer (1999), in the debate, probably made it more likely that bidders would 
behave according to the theory. Similarly, other advantaged firms have made a point 
of emphasizing the common-values theory—and their own belief in it. For example, 
Pacific Telephone paid an auction theorist
82 to give seminars explaining the ‘winner’s 
curse’ at industry gatherings prior to a US mobile phone license auction in which it 
was the advantaged incumbent.
83
Another argument against the MMC’s decision was that the television rights did not 
need to be sold using an ascending auction, and ‘toehold’ problems are unlikely to be 
significant in, for example, a sealed-bid auction: we will address this argument in the 
next section.
84
6. Bid-taker  power 
An important feature of auctions and bidding processes is that the bid-taker often has 
far more control over the competitive process than an ordinary consumer does. 
Skilful use of the bid-taker’s monopsonistic power to design and run the contest can 
mitigate the competition problems.  
However, there are also many constraints and limitations on bid-takers’ power. 
Although good auction design may be able to overcome these problems in principle, 
regulators must be careful not to take too rosy a view of what bid-takers can 
realistically achieve in practice. Indeed, where bidders can lobby against or otherwise 
subvert the rules and/or the bid-taker cannot precommit his future behaviour, the bid-
taker’s ‘power’ can actually work against him and aggravate the competitive 
problems. 
6.1  Tailoring the rules 
Sealed-bid auctions 
It will be apparent from the previous discussion that many problems of entry 
deterrence, predation, and collusion can be avoided by choosing sealed-bid rather 
than ascending auction rules. Sealed-bid auctions may also be more profitable for 
bid-takers even absent these problems, especially when bidders’ risk-aversion is 
important, as is likely in a large ‘winner-take-all’ ‘bet-your-company’ contest (ie when 
conditions (1) and (2) of an ideal ‘bidding market’ are satisfied). See, especially, 
sections 4.3 to 4.5 and 5.2 above, and Klemperer (1999a, 2002a) for more details.  
 
 
81See MMC (1999, para 2.116). 
82Not me! 
83Conversely, one major oil company is said to have deliberately cultivated a reputation for not believing in economic theory. 
84An alternative view was that antitrust policy did not go far enough: after BSkyB was prohibited from taking over Manchester 
United it very quickly took small minority stakes in all of Manchester United, Manchester City, Chelsea, Leeds, and Sunderland, 
thus to some degree recreating the ‘toehold’ stake in football television revenues that had caused concern, while evading the 
MMC’s scrutiny because the stakes were too small to qualify as mergers. (In principle the Office of Fair Trading could have 
taken action, but this might have been hard.) Perhaps since BSkyB already had a very strong position, it should have been 
prohibited from developing a toehold, but it would have helped ‘level the playing field’, and so been good for competition, if any 
of BSkyB’s rivals had developed a toehold. In fact, NTL dropped a bid to acquire Newcastle but took minority stakes in Aston 
Villa, Leeds, Middlesbrough and Newcastle. 
 24Anglo-Dutch auctions 
Although a sealed-bid auction has many advantages, it is often socially less efficient 
than an ascending auction (see section 4.2). A solution to the dilemma of choosing 
between the ascending (often called ‘English’) and sealed-bid (or ‘Dutch’) forms is to 
combine the two in a hybrid, the ‘Anglo-Dutch’, which often captures the best 
features of both, and was first described and proposed in Klemperer (1998). 
Assuming, for simplicity, a single object is to be auctioned, the auctioneer begins by 
running an ascending auction in which price is raised continuously until all but two 
bidders have dropped out. These two bidders are then each required to make a final 
sealed-bid offer that is not lower than the current asking price, and the winner pays 
his bid.
85
Among its other advantages, the Anglo-Dutch auction encourages entry and 
discourages collusion (just like a sealed bid auction) but is more likely to sell to the 
highest valuer than a pure sealed-bid auction, both because it directly reduces the 
numbers allowed into the sealed-bid stage and also because the two finalists can 
learn something about each other's and the remaining bidders’ perceptions of the 
object's value from behaviour during the ascending stage. See Klemperer (1998, 
2002a) for a fuller discussion of the Anglo-Dutch auction’s advantages. 
It was first developed for practical use in the design of the UK 3G auction where it 
was proposed to use it to encourage entry in the event only four licences were 
available for sale, since the UK industry had exactly four strong incumbent operators. 
There is evidence that it might have been successful in this, but in the event a fifth 
license became available for sale so it was no longer appropriate to use it (see 
Binmore and Klemperer (2002)). However, formal Anglo-Dutch procedures have 
subsequently been used very successfully in auctions of electricity (see eg Woo et al 
(2004)) and real estate (Moreland (2004)).
86
Fine-Tuning ascending auctions 
An alternative approach is to try to make the ascending auction more robust. For 
example, requiring bids to be ‘round’ numbers, prespecifying the exact increments, 
and making bids anonymous, make it harder to use bids to signal other buyers.
87 
Aggregating lots into larger packages makes it harder for bidders to ‘divide the 
spoils’, and keeping secret the number of bidders remaining also makes collusion 
harder (Cramton and Schwartz, 2000; Salant, 2000). But these measures do not 
eliminate the risks of collusion, and do very little to mitigate the discouraging effect of 
ascending auctions on entry. Moreover, bidders can often adapt their behaviour to 
overcome such minor ‘fixes’ faster than bid-takers can develop new fixes (see also 
section 6.2). 
Other new procedures 
There has recently been enormous interest in designing new auction procedures, 
though there is a paucity of theory about how effective many of them are—especially 
 
 
85Many houses are sold using a similar, but less formal, process. Similarly, in WR Hambrecht’s OpenBook auctions for 
corporate bonds, the early bidding is public and ascending but higher bidders are given an advantage in a final sealed-bid 
stage (although in this case all bidders are permitted to enter the final stage). The process also has some similarity to auctions 
on eBay which are ascending price, but with a fixed ending time so that many bidders often bid only in the last few seconds in 
essentially sealed-bid style. 
86I am aware of the formal Anglo-Dutch auction having been recently used in Florida, Texas and the Netherlands. I would be 
eager to hear about other practical applications. 
87See Salmon (2004) for discussion of some of these ideas. 
 25the multi-unit ones.
88 Of particular note for resolving anti-trust concerns is 
Ausubel’s (2004) popularization of a modification of the multi-unit ascending auction 
that creates a dynamic version of the Vickrey auction and so eliminates classical 
‘unilateral effects’, that is, it eliminates bidders’ incentives to scale back their 
demands (or supplies) in order to end the auction quickly at an uncompetitive price.
89 
However, this auction can reduce bid-taker surplus so may not fit most regulators’ 
objectives.
90 Furthermore, its relative complexity both makes it difficult to explain, and 
means that bidding may be affected less in practice than in theory (some 
experiments suggest this). Perhaps for these reasons, I am not aware of it having 
been applied in practice. In practical auction design, simplicity is crucial, and it is 
much easier to ‘sell’ designs that are similar to well-known institutions. (For example, 
the adoption of the Anglo-Dutch auction for practical use has been helped by 




An important aspect of sealed-bid auction rules is whether or not bids are secret. Just 
as in ‘ordinary’ markets, keeping bids secret makes it harder for bidders to coordinate 
their activities and makes defection from a collusive agreement harder to observe 
and therefore more attractive. So secrecy fights collusion between bidders. 
Unfortunately secrecy may also facilitate collusion between the bid-taker and one or 
more bidders,
92 and the fear of this may also sometimes discourage entry. 
Allowing each bidder to submit multiple sealed bids over a period of time can help 
frustrate collusion by making it harder for bidders to monitor each other, and keeping 
the number and identities of bidders secret can also make an auction more 
competitive (especially if bidders are risk averse) and encourage entry.
93
Reserve prices 
A very powerful use of the bid-taker’s monopoly (or monopsony) position is in setting 
a reserve price. Of course, it must be credible that the bid-taker will stick to the 
announced reserve (see section 6.2). 
Discrimination 
Discriminating between bidders by setting different reserve prices, or by giving 
bidding credits to particular bidders or particular classes of bidders, corresponds 
exactly to price discrimination in ordinary markets in forcing stronger bidders to bid 
 
 
88Milgrom (2004) is an excellent introduction to the state of the art in multi-unit auctions.  
89Similar unilateral effects, in which bidders reduce demands (or supplies) to make the auction price(s) less competitive for their 
remaining demands (or supplies), also arise in other multi-unit auctions (or sequential single-unit auctions). 
90There are also other difficulties: for example, high valuers are often required to pay less than low-valuers (which seems odd to 
policy makers), and it creates difficult-to-guard-against opportunities for collusion, so it is probably only useful in carefully 
controlled environments. 
91See also footnote 85 above. By contrast, the attempt to implement a slightly novel design in Hong Kong was a disaster—see 
next subsection and Klemperer (2003a). 
92A very simple form of collusion is for the bid-taker to tell a bidder what its competitors have bid. This may be prevented by 
having all bids publicly opened. 
93For example, when Denmark ran the last of the 2000 to 2001 European 3G auctions, the government was rightly concerned 
whether it could attract any new entrant given that the number of licences equalled the number of incumbents—see our 
discussion of the Netherlands’ auction in section 5.2 (and since also the telecom market had by then gone so sour). They 
followed all the strategies in this (‘secrecy’) sub-subsection, and ran a highly successful auction. See Klemperer (2002b, 
2003a). McAfee and McMillan (1987, 1988) argue that the Canadian utility company Ontario Hydro benefited from keeping the 
number of bidders secret in auctions it ran. 
 26more aggressively (see Bulow and Roberts (1989)). It can also encourage the entry 
of weaker bidders into the auction.
94
Sometimes it is possible to pay bidders to enter an auction; for example, firms’ bid-
preparation costs can be reimbursed,
95 or ‘white knights’ can be offered options to 
enter a takeover battle against an advantaged bidder. 
Where awarding a contract means evaluating multiple criteria, for example, price and 
quality, it may be possible to induce more competitive bidding by precommitting to 
underweight or ignore one criterion. An illustration of this is that part of the power of a 
buying group (eg a hospital) may be that the average preference of their members 
(eg doctors and nurses) is closer to the average of different brands than is the 
preference of an individual member. Central procurement from a single vendor may 
therefore achieve a better price (Farrell and Klemperer, 2000).  
Bundling and packaging 
Another reason why procuring from a single vendor may be desirable is that it takes 
advantage of bidder’s risk aversion. By making a contract larger, it may be possible 
to turn it into a ‘must-win’ for one or more bidders, who will then bid more 
competitively.96 Bundling can also prevent both unilateral and coordinated effects 
(see, for example, sections 3.2-3.3 and 4.4-4.5), by making it impossible for bidders 
to ‘divide the pie’ among themselves. On the other hand, committing to divide a prize 
among multiple winners can sometimes attract entry of weaker bidders, and may also 
induce more competitive bidding by reducing winner’s curses. 
97
Bundling and packaging can often reduce inefficiency when complementary goods or 
contracts are auctioned—in the absence of bundling, some bidders may end up stuck 
with objects that are worth very little to them because they failed to win 
complementary objects (the so-called ‘exposure’ problem), while other bidders may 
fail to bid at all (or quit an ascending auction early) in fear of this.  
On the other hand, bundling can also increase inefficiency while raising bid-taker 
surplus, in exactly the same way that bundling products, or offering non-linear pricing 
and quantity discounts, can raise an ‘ordinary’ monopolist’s profits at the same time 
as lowering social surplus. The antitrust issues parallel issues of monopoly bundling 
and exclusion in ‘ordinary’ markets.  
Bundling and packaging is especially critical when an auction creates a new market 
(as, for example, the 3G spectrum auctions created the 3G mobile phone markets). 
Allowing the industry structure to be determined in the auction (eg by selling many 
small blocks of spectrum, but allowing each firm to win multiple blocks) has the 
advantage that the outcome depends on bidders’ private information, but the 
disadvantage that bidders’ objectives are not the social objectives. So it may be 
better to determine the industry structure in advance (eg by fixing the number and 
 
 
94Ayres and Cramton (1996) estimate that offering 40 per cent bidding credits to ‘designated bidders’ (ie the bid-taker agreed to 
refund 40 per cent of winning bids by firms controlled by women, minorities, etc), together with favourable terms for payment by 
installment, actually raised the Federal Government’s revenue (by $45 million, or about 12 per cent) in the 1994 sale of regional 
narrowband PCS spectrum.  
95Similarly, the United Kingdom Inland Revenue (ie tax collecting authority) recently paid bidders to undertake exploratory 
studies about how a large IT project might be designed and managed, as a way of reducing these bidders’ information 
disadvantages relative to the better-informed incumbent who had won the previous contract. 
96One way to make a contract larger is to aggregate several auctions that would otherwise take place at different times. 
97See sections 4.3 and 5.2, Gilbert and Klemperer (2000), and Bulow and Klemperer (2002). Using such ‘split-award’ auctions 
is just a form of offering ‘second prizes’ and, when it would be efficient and/or would ex-post maximize bid-taker surplus to have 
a single winner, can be seen as a form of discriminating in favour of weaker bidders.  
 27sizes of licences for sale, and allowing firms to win at most one each). The choice 
between these approaches is a topic of active research (see, eg Hoppe, Jehiel and 
Moldovanu (forthcoming)), but it is not yet easy to make many general statements.  
Controlling resale 
Resale can render both discrimination and bundling ineffective, so in the simplest 
models with a fixed number of bidders who know their own current and future values, 
a bid-taker wants to prevent resale—exactly as a price-discriminating monopolist in 
an ‘ordinary’ market needs to prevent resale. However, the possibility of resale can 
also give arbitrageurs an incentive to participate in the auction (which increases its 
competitiveness),
98 and re-sale also allows bidders to respond to new information 
about their valuations of the assets.
99 So the effects on an auction of the knowledge 
that re-sale will subsequently be permitted are complex. A natural instinct is that it is 
likely to be broadly efficient (even though it will not always maximise bid-taker 
surplus) to permit the re-sale of assets such as licences in the same way, and 
subject to similar rules, as mergers of firms. However, more research is needed to 
confirm or refute this.  
Antitrust rules 
Finally, as must by now be clear, where bid-takers have the power (for example, 
when they are governments), it is important for them to ensure normal antitrust rules 
apply (see section 7). 
6.2  Constraints on bid-taker power 
Although in theory bid-takers have many instruments available to them, they also 
face important constraints including governmental or supragovernmental legislation 
or procedures, internal-organizational issues, bidders’ countervailing tactics, and the 
difficulty of committing their own future behaviour. Bid-takers that are government 
agencies are often especially severely constrained. 
Most obviously, a prohibition on resale may be hard to enforce, so strategies 
involving discriminating between bidders and/or bundling may be ineffective.
100
Moreover, State Aid (and other) legislation generally prevents European 
governments from explicitly discriminating between bidders (eg using targeted 
bidding credits), and while similar ends can often be achieved using technically-
neutral rules, (eg placing more weight on criteria which favour the preferred 
bidder(s)) this is usually less efficient. For example, in the UK 3G auction we were 
advised that bidding credits to encourage entry were not permissible. However, 
choosing auction rules that favoured entry, specifically an Anglo-Dutch auction, was 
possible. So was dividing the available spectrum into a large enough number of 
licences that one would have to be won by an entrant—in other words, running a 
 
 
98Pagnozzi (2004b) models how the bargaining in the aftermarket is itself affected by the outcome of the auction, and how the 
possibility of entering the resale market can both induce bidders to drop out of an auction early and give arbitrageurs a strong 
incentive to participate. 
99But resale does not resolve all inefficiencies, even when firms’ private objectives are the social objectives (Cai (2000), 
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987)). 
100For example, on one occasion when the US government offered bidding credits to firms controlled by women (ie  the 
government agreed to refund a percentage of winning bids by such firms), a female executive resigned her position at a large 
established firm to form a new company to bid in the auction and re-sell the rights to her original employer with—it is said—the 
resale terms settled in advance of her departure and a promise that she could return to her original job if her new company 
failed to win the auction. Such strategies obviously vitiate the point of bidding credits.  
 28‘split award’ auction (in fact broader competition policy reasons dictated this choice 
anyway, once it became clear it was technically feasible).
101 
102  
UK Government legislation imposed other constraints on the 3G auction design that 
could only have been removed by parliamentary legislation—an option that was not 
favoured by Ministers for whom parliamentary time is a scarce resource; fortunately 
further legislation turned out to be unnecessary in this case. (See Binmore and 
Klemperer (2002).)
103
Political constraints are much broader than purely legal ones. For example, when the 
UK Competition Commission ruled on the proposed merger of private prison 
operators Falck and Wackenhut,
104 an important issue was whether the UK Prison 
Service could realistically use its monopsony power to eliminate competitive 
problems—for example, the political imperatives of privatization limited the scope to 
threaten public provision as an alternative to private procurement.  
Internal-organizational issues can importantly affect behaviour in both the public and 
the private sector, since decision-makers’ incentives are rarely perfectly aligned with 
their organization’s. For example, managers may be much more interested in 
obtaining short-term cost savings than in avoiding ‘lock-in’ problems developing on 
follow-on contracts after they have moved on from their current jobs—it is very hard 
to structure incentives to overcome this problem. Decentralised decision-making also 
creates severe problems. The drug-purchasing decisions made by UK hospitals, for 
example, effectively determine many ‘follow-on’ drug purchases in the community—
which are paid for by different parts of the National Health Service (NHS). It seems 
naïve to argue that because the NHS could in principle centralise its drug 
procurement, the competition authorities should not be concerned about the kind of 
predatory behaviour alleged in the NAPP case:
105 effective competition policy must 
sometimes take the larger organizational structure of bid-takers as given—just as it 
must often accept the current industrial structure.  
Another constraint on bid-takers is that auction designs (especially government ones) 
are often susceptible to lobbying. In this context the bid-taker’s ability to set and 
amend the rules can be a liability. I have described elsewhere how the Hong Kong 
3G auction designers found their auction publicly vilified as the ‘dark auction’ and 
were forced to make a superficially small change to the rules that vitiated the point of 
the design and had disastrous consequences (Klemperer (2003a)). Industry lobbying 
also seems to have been effective in damaging the Netherlands 3G sales process—it 
is clear that the Netherlands’ Government’s choice of auction design was a very poor 




101State Aid rules create broader constraints. For example when I advised the UK on the design of the world’s first auction of 
greenhouse gas emissions, the EU Commission insisted on rules that made a minimum number of winners sufficiently likely, 
and negotiating State Aid clearance was an important issue. (See Klemperer et al (forthcoming).) Nevertheless, the overall 
effect of State Aid legislation is probably to promote competition. 
102A Netherlands auction worth hundreds of millions of Euros famously fell foul of the EU and was—it is said—hurriedly 
redesigned on a Friday afternoon, with laughable results (see van Damme (1999)). 
103The Freedom of Information Act is a very recent piece of UK Government legislation that weakens bid-takers’ power, by 
making it hard or impossible to keep auction outcomes secret (see section 6.1). 
104See UK Competition Commission (2002). 
105NAPP Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd was able to preclude entry into the hospital market for sustained release morphine 
products. Sales to hospitals led to ‘follow on’ community sales where NAPP’s prices were more than ten times higher. See 
Farrell and Klemperer (forthcoming). In principle the problems could probably have been resolved if purchases for hospitals and 
the community were made simultaneously by a single organization. 
106The industry also lobbied effectively against a better (ie earlier) timing for the auction, which might have made the flawed 
design less vulnerable. (The first European auction was always likely to attract the most potential entrants—see Klemperer 
(2002b, 2003a)—and the Netherlands’ industry lobbying helped ensure that the UK won the race to be first by a clear margin.)  
 29The UK design team had a happier experience when proposing two alternative 
similar designs meant that lobbyists for the incumbent operators (who hated both 
designs) concentrated much of their energy on the choice between them. Perhaps as 
a result, and even though (it is rumoured) they spent considerably more money in a 
few weeks lobbying against the designs than the UK Government spent on economic 
advice, modelling, and testing, over the whole two-and-a-half year process, our 
proposal that (either) one of the designs would be used survived their onslaught. (We 
graciously acceded to the lobbyists’ choice between the two designs—as we 
anticipated, they preferred the same design that we did.) It was unsurprising that the 
incumbents spent so much money on lobbying, since a design that was different from 
either of the two we proposed could easily have saved them £15 billion. 
Bidders are powerful in other ways too. For example, they may be able to subvert an 
auction if the bid-taker cannot commit to keeping information about bids secret. For 
example, a concern about the proposed BSkyB/Manchester United combination 
discussed above (section 5.2) was that the risk of information leaking through 
Manchester United to BSkyB would leave the Premier League (of which Manchester 
United is one member) unable to negotiate effectively with broadcasters. 
Even bigger problems can arise if bidders refuse to accept the outcome of an 
auction, and the bid-taker cannot precommit to sticking to it (perhaps because 
shareholders, or more senior managers, or political masters cannot be precommitted, 
or because of legal constraints). As discussed above (section 4.1) this turns a so-
called ‘sealed-bid’ auction into an ascending auction.
107 Thus, for example, although 
as we discussed in section 5.2 the Premier League could in principle have alleviated 
any ‘toehold’ problems by using a sealed-bid auction, the MMC took the view that the 
Premier League would be unable to stop the sales process degenerating into an 
ascending auction if that were in BSkyB’s interest. This would be especially true after 
a BSkyB/Manchester United combination, since Manchester United could then help 
undermine the bidding process,
108 but the MMC noted that even on previous 
occasions, when no such combination existed, ‘Although the sale of Premier League 
rights … had the appearance of a sealed-bid auction, the reality was rather 
different’.
109
7.  Other antitrust issues 
Efficiencies in mergers 
In ‘ordinary’ markets mergers often generate efficiencies through the transfer of more 
of the industry’s output to a lower-cost firm, even if the merger does not reduce the 
component businesses’ costs. In a ‘winner-take-all’ market efficiencies, if any, are of 
a different kind; a merger increases efficiency only if it increases the chance of the 
most efficient bidder winning. So, for example, in a private-values ascending auction 
there are no social efficiencies from merging, and in other kinds of auctions any 
 
 
107This has often been a problem in the sale of companies—including of Glaxo (see section 4.3) and RJR-Nabisco (see 
footnote 38). 
108The MMC wrote ‘if it looked as if [BSkyB’s] bid … was not going to be successful … Manchester United could come to the 
meeting of the Premier League at which final rights bids from broadcasters were due to be considered armed with authority 
from BSkyB to make an improved bid on BSkyB’s behalf. Even if the introduction of an improved bid at the meeting were 
against the Premier League’s bidding rules, we see no practical way in which it could be prevented. …. We think that it would 
not be too difficult to [at least force] the rights auction to go to another round … by converting a sealed bid auction into an 
ascending price one it would gain an additional advantage from the toehold effect’ (MMC (1999, paras 2.129-2.130)). 
109MMC (1999, para 2.115). 





Just as there is now a significant literature on simulation of the unilateral effects of 
mergers in ‘ordinary’ markets, so there is a subliterature on simulating unilateral 
effects when prices are set in auctions (looking at how the static Nash equilibrium of 
a market is altered by a merger), see Werden and Froeb (forthcoming). 
Detecting collusion 
On the one hand detecting collusion in auctions is potentially problematic, because of 
the low quality of information that is often available—often, the reason an auction 
rather than a more traditional posted-price process is used is precisely because bid-
takers have poor information, and bidders have significant private information, about 
costs and valuations, perhaps for an idiosyncratic transaction. On the other hand, 
there is often extremely good data about all bids and, especially when many similar 
contracts are auctioned, it is possible to test whether suspected colluders behave 
similarly to assumed-competitive firms and, more generally, whether firm behaviour 
better fits a competitive or collusive model.
112 The literature on the econometrics of 




A main theme of this paper (and of Klemperer (2002a)) is that the key antitrust 
challenge is simply to recognize that the particular method of price-formation in 
auctions and bidding processes does not affect the fundamental principles of 
antitrust. Historically anti-trust agencies have largely failed to grasp this. Bidders 
have openly taken actions in auctions that would never have been regarded as 
acceptable in ‘ordinary’ markets. 
For example, regulators did not pursue the apparent use of bids in some of the early 
US mobile-phone licence auctions to signal to rivals in the manner illustrated in 
section 4.4. (One problem is persuading courts that observed bidding is necessarily 
anti-competitive signaling; usually some competitive story can be concocted.) 
Similarly, statements that would be classed as predatory in ‘ordinary’ markets passed 
 
 
110In theory symmetric models usually have efficient outcomes. In practice, outcomes are not always efficient, and a merger that 
created a sufficiently strong firm might improve efficiency.  
111Of course, a merger can still create efficiencies if it lowers the merged firm’s costs below the minimum of either merging 
party’s costs—for example, if it turns two small firms, who could not realistically compete independently for a contract, into a 
single operator with the scale to compete for the contract—but this point applies equally to ‘ordinary’ markets. 
112The data is often better for sealed-bid auctions (since losing bids are often available) than for ascending auctions (where only 
the final loser’s drop-out price is generally known), but on the other hand the relationship between bids and valuations or costs 
is much simpler in an ascending auction.  
For example, Porter and Zona (1993) and Bajari and Ye (2003) examine data sets of first-price sealed-bid procurement 
auctions for highway construction contracts and for highway maintenance projects, respectively, while Porter and Zona (1999), 
Lanzillotti  (1996), Scott (2000) and Pesendorfer (2000) all look at such auctions for school milk; Baldwin, Marshall and 
Richard (1997) and Banerji and Meenakshi (2004) look at ascending auctions of timber and wheat, respectively. 
One issue is that a clever-enough collusive mechanism could, in principle, mimic what would be the competitive outcome with 
different costs or valuations. Another issue is that the tests in these papers may be sensitive to misspecification of, eg costs, 
and we have already noted that although there may be good data about bids, other data about auctions is often poor. In 
practice, however, these studies seem to have some success in identifying collusion; some of their results are corroborated by 
independent information about whether collusion was present. 
113See also Porter (2004). Harrington also analyses broader implications of collusion that apply to ‘ordinary’ as well as auction 
markets. 
 31unchallenged, and the ARCO Vice-President who originally encouraged his staff to 
coin the evocative term, the ‘winner’s curse’, and discuss it at industry gatherings and 
so persuade competitors to bid less aggressively, actually described his strategy as 
‘legalized collusion’.
114 Collusion in takeover battles for companies is legal in the 
USA. However, the US Department of Justice did successfully pursue a case of 
using bids to signal in a more recent spectrum auction,
115 and the US competition 
authorities are arguably more sophisticated in their treatment of bidding markets than 
sometimes seems to be the case elsewhere in the world. 
European antitrust has been even more feeble than in the USA. Regulators have 
tolerated a range of explicit collusive and predatory statements about auctions that 
would surely be unacceptable if made about a ‘normal’ economic market,
116 and 
accepted joint-bidding agreements that are, in effect, open collusion.
117,
118 It may be 
that the antitrust climate for auctions has toughened a little: T-Mobil was willing to 
explicitly confirm the way its rival and it had used bids as signals to coordinate a 
rapid end to a German spectrum auction in 1999, but the same firm (and its 
competitors) refused to confirm officially that they were signalling to rivals when 
apparently similar behaviour was observed in the German 3G spectrum auction a 
year later.
119 However, European regulators have shown little appetite for pursuing 
such matters,
120 and often persist in treating auction markets more laxly than 
‘ordinary’ economic markets. The European Commission’s treatment of some recent 
bidding-market cases suggests some improvement in the level of its analysis. But 
Europe still has a long way to go in its handling of auctions and bidding processes. 
8. Conclusion 
Discussions of ‘bidding markets’ often confuse details of the price formation process 
(whether or not there is an auction or bidding system) with deeper structural features 
 
 
114See American Association of Petroleum Geologists (2004), describing the process leading Atlantic Richfield Company staff to 
the publication of Capen, Clapp, and Campbell (1971). Of course, the line between legitimate dissemination of research results 
and other efficiency-enhancing information sharing on the one hand, and illegitimate behaviour on the other, is a hard one to 
draw. But Klemperer (2002a) suggests Pacific Telephone should perhaps have been regarded as having crossed that line with 
their remark prior to the main US 1995 mobile phone license auction that ‘if somebody takes California away from us, they'll 
never make any money’—this seems to correspond to threatening that ‘if anyone tries to compete with us, we'll cut the price 
until they lose money’. Likewise, Pacific Telephone’s hiring of an auction theorist to explain the winner’s curse to competitors 
might correspond to hiring an industrial economist to explain the theory of the difficulties of entering new markets to potential 
entrants. 
115The case resulted in consent decrees against Mercury PCS II, L.L.C., Omnipoint Corporation, and 21st Century Bidding 
Corp. See US v. Mercury PCS II, L.L.C. (1998). 
116Klemperer (2002a) cites many examples: for example, before the Austrian third-generation spectrum auction Telekom 
Austria, the largest incumbent and presumably the strongest among the six bidders, said it ‘would be satisfied with just two of 
the 12 blocks of frequency on offer’ and ‘if the [five other bidders] behaved similarly it should be possible to get the frequencies 
on sensible terms’, but ‘it would bid for a third block if one of its rivals did’ (Reuters, 31/10/2000)). It seems inconceivable that a 
dominant firm in a ‘normal’ market would be allowed to make the equivalent offer and threat that it ‘would be satisfied with a 
market share of just (one-sixth)’ and ‘if the other five firms also stick to (one-sixth) of the market each, it should be possible to 
sell at high prices’, but ‘it would compete aggressively for a larger share, if any of its rivals aimed for more than (1/6)’. 
Similarly, during the German third-generation spectrum auction, MobilCom told a newspaper that ‘should [Debitel] fail to secure 
a license [it could] become a ‘virtual network operator’ using MobilCom’s network while saving on the cost of the license’ 
(Benoît, 2000 p.28). This translates roughly to a firm in a ‘normal’ market saying it ‘would supply a rival should it choose to exit 
the market’, but MobilCom’s remarks went unpunished. 
Glaxo let it be known that it ‘would almost certainly top a rival bid’ (Wighton 1995b) in the takeover battle discussed in section 
4.3, which would roughly translate to an incumbent firm in a ‘normal’ economic market saying it ‘would almost certainly 
undercut any new entrant’s price’. 
117 The 2000 to 2001 European 3G auctions provide numerous illustrations. See Klemperer (2002b).  
118 One issue is that bidders are buyers rather than sellers in many auctions, and the European Commission guidelines on 
cooperation agreements (European Commission, 2001) are much more tolerant of cooperation among buyers than of 
cooperation among sellers. This is another respect in which US antitrust seems to differ from European antitrust.  
119The co-ordination in the 1999 German auction is described in footnote 54. On the occasion of the later 3G auction, the 
Financial Times reported: ‘One operator has privately admitted to altering the last digit of its bid in a semi-serious attempt to 
signal to other participants that it was willing to accept [fewer lots to end the auction]’ (Roberts and Ward, 2000, p.21), but the 
firms were not willing to confirm this. See Klemperer (2003a, 2002d) for more discussion of these two auctions. 
120This kind of signalling behaviour could perhaps be challenged as an abuse of ‘joint dominance’ under EC and UK law.  
 32of the market. While these structural features are often associated with auction 
processes, they need not be. Furthermore, while these structural features would—if 
they obtained—lead to very optimistic conclusions about the welfare consequences 
of the markets, this is nothing new. And if—as is common—they do not apply, similar 
competition problems arise in auction markets as in ‘ordinary’ economic markets, and 
for similar reasons. Moreover, even where behaviour in auctions is a little different, or 
more extreme, than in an ‘ordinary market’—in particular, in some ‘ascending 
auction’ cases—these differences can usually be understood in terms of the standard 
principles of antitrust. 
In short, the term ‘bidding market’ as it is widely used in antitrust seems unhelpful or 
misleading.  
Auctions and bidding processes do have special features, including their special 
price-formation processes, common-values behaviour, and bid-taker power. 
However, the significance of some of these features has been greatly 
overemphasized, while others imply a need for stricter rather than more lenient 
antitrust policy.  
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